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SELECTIONS FROM SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY JOURNALS

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Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 82 pp 1-2

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## ENGLISH SUMMARIES OF MAJOR ARTICLES

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 82 pp 220-222

["Summaries of Major Articles" written in English]

[Text] Problems of the National Fund of Accumulation in African Countries

[Authors] M. M. Avsenev, S. M. Angarov

Analyzing the problems of internal accumulation of states of Tropical Africa, following the capitalist path of development, the article argues that today the non-monopoly private sector is not in a position to act as a leading agent of accumulation and shoulder the responsibility of overcoming the economic backwardness.

The foreign monopoly capital is manifest in the national reproduction process, primarily, as an enclave. Therefore, the article maintains, the individual capitals of the TNCs subsidiaries cannot be included into the aggregate social capital and their extended reproduction cannot be considered from the standpoint of the extended reproduction of the social capital, as a whole. This type of capital belongs to the reproduction process realized by "the centers" of the world capitalism in the periphery of the world capitalist system.

Objectively, this contradiction could have been removed by enhancing the role of the state in the formation of the accumulation fund. However, in conditions of capitalist development, the activity of the state is subordinated to the interest of the private sector. The state, consequently, participates in the production of the social surplus in a modest way, its role being limited to the redistribution.

On the strength of the analysis it is suggested that the capitalist pattern of accumulation aggravates the contradictions of the reproduction process. On the whole, the capitalist path of development is not able to solve the problem of forming the internal sources of accumulation.

Arab World: Resources and Unequality of Economic Development, [Author] S. L. Stoklitsky

Examining the data regarding mineral, land and labor resources of Arab countries, the article attracts attention to serious economic disproportions within the region. This fact produces stable disbalances between the availability of certain natural resources and their current need.

Analyzing the resource endowment factor, the author calls for a more sophisticated approach in dividing the Arab world into the oil exporting and importing countries. This approach, along with the current level of oil production, should take into consideration the national oil reserves and current and prospective oil requirements within the country.

The article also highlights the interrelationship between the national resources and social factors of development. As the experience of the region testifies, the approach based on the progressive social transformations is the one that yields the best results.

Prerevolutionary Socio-Political Crisis in Afghanistan, [Author] N. M. Gurevich

The prerevolutionary Afghanistan was an agrarian state. Its agriculture was dominated by feudal relationship coupled with prefeudal leftovers. Due to this the standard of living of the bulk of the population was extremely low. At the same time, the gains of Socialist construction in the USSR, and the Central Asian republics in particular, the mounting national-liberation struggle in the Afro-Asian countries and the anti-Afghan propaganda of the Pakistani government after the war had a growing bearing upon the political situation in Afghanistan. The earliest and most "noticeable" signs of the situation's deterioration were the contradictions and the struggle within the ruling Nadir dynasty, which led to the change of the cabinet in 1953 and substantial modifications of policy both at home and abroad. These developments, as the article suggests, were brought about by internal socio-economic processes, notably, the impoverishment of the peasantry and the growing inequality in the distribution of social product.

The increasing population growth and the medieval level of the production forces' development in agriculture accounted for the falling rate of the agricultural production per capita. This process was accentuated by the accumulation of wealth by a handful of exploiters. The latter used to invest into the non-productive sectors of economy, indulged in extravagant personal consumption and transferred their capital abroad. All this was the main cause of the growing conflict between the antagonistic classes which gave rise to the national and democratic Revolution of 1978.

Old and New in Upbringing of Children in a Japanese Family, [Author] I. A. Latyshev

The recent changes in the Japanese way of life and mentality undermined the traditional system of bringing up children. The peculiarity of this system is bound up with the national pattern of life. The traditional Japanese system of upbringing prevailed in the country before the Second World War and over the two

decades following the war. Today, only few elements of this system are preserved. The examination of the current system of upbringing demonstrates that the influence of traditions is diminishing. The very system and the Japanese mode of life resemble in an ever growing degree the patterns of life in developed capitalist states. In many ways the current practice of upbringing does not differ from that of America or Europe.

Linguistic Situation in Multinational Afro-Asian Countries, [Author] L. B. Nikolsky

The problem of linguistic stability is investigated by examining the situation when a) one of the original languages is used as inter-ethnic medium (macromediator), and b) the sole macromediator is the language of the former colonial power.

The linguistic situation is subject to ethnic processes, primarily of the consolidating and assimilative nature. The consolidating processes may embrace all the ethnoses of a particular country or relate to one region, depending on the ethnolinguistic situation. The latter conditions the scale and nature of the consolidating process, in course of which the original language gains acceptance and thus determines the type of the linguistic situation and its modifications. The article singles out 1) countries with one dominating ethnos in terms of population and several small ones, 2) countries with a few large and many small ethnoses, 3) countries with several small ethnoses.

In the first case, the major ethnos augments and spreads its language throughout the country due to the demographic factor. In the second instance, the consolidation assumes an enclave nature and a number of linguistic units arises. In case they bring about national and territorial autonomy, the role of respective languages enhances which, in its turn, is fraught with changes of the overall linguistic situation. Due to the unresolved nature of the national problem the linguistic situation is characterized by the unstable balance of the two macromediators, i.e. the original language and that of the former colonial power.

In the third case, the linguistic situation is a stable one: the role of the macromediator has been acquired by the West European language, there are no processes which would lead to its substitution by an original language. In all probability, the West European language will continue to be the medium of inter-ethnic communication and state integration for a long time to come.

Reflection of the Traditional Society in the French-Language Literature of Maghrib, [Author] S. V. Prozhogina

The attention paid by the North African writers to the reality of the newly-liberated states, their awareness of the controversial nature of the post-independent period brings about disenchantment regarding the unfulfilled ideals of national-liberation revolutions and non-acceptance of the new order, in which a human being is a prisoner of the relics of the past, and simultaneously a desire to reform this order.



The analysis of the oeuvres of A. Khatibi, T. Benjelloun, M. Khair Eddine, A. Laabi and others demonstrates that they advocate the revision of the past so far as it comes to hamper and impede the progress of a new life.

**Medieval Indian City, [Author] K. Z. Ashrafyan**

Using the statistics of the "Ain-i-Akbari" of Abu-l-Fazl Allami and "Mirat-i-Ahmadi" of Ali Muhammad Khan Bahadur, the article analyzes the medieval city of India as a socio-economic phenomenon.

It is suggested that the economic structure of the village and that of the medieval city differed considerably; the land tax in the city greatly exceeded that of rural areas; the city had an encouraging effect upon the suburban areas; a substantial number of the rural districts close to urban centers constituted specific economic units, which bore the impact of the city; modification of the caste composition of agricultural groups, represented at times by urban trade castes; a considerable proportion of urban taxes in the surplus product.

On the strength of these observations the author comes to the conclusion that typologically the medieval Indian city resembled those of Europe of the same period. The potential it possessed, however, had not been realized due to the European trade expansion and the advent of colonialism, which put an end to the independent development of the country.

**Intra-Group Bureaucratic Struggle in China of the 12th Century, [Author] S. N. Goncharov**

The Chinese bureaucratic system and the official's mental and psychological set-up were formed in the Sung period (960-1279). A bureaucrat had to master "the rules of the game," i.e. the ways of inter-party struggle to survive and to climb up the career ladder. These rules were determined by the structure of the Sung state machinery.

By examining the struggle between "the factions of war and peace" from 1127 to 11427 [as printed], the article demonstrates that any Chancellor wishing his policy to succeed had to have his own people in control bodies. The latter in this case ceased to perform their functions and could be manipulated against the Chancellor's political opponents. Thus, the very structure of the bureaucratic system engendered factions.

Another way practised by the Chancellor to neutralize the control bodies was to establish his "own" office to by-pass the routine procedures. By gaining support of the Emperor he could also see his decisions implemented through "the chits written in the Emperor's own hand" (yu-pi), which were not subject to control bodies.

The Chancellor tended to promote officials of low standing which would fully depend upon his wish and blindly obey his instructions. It was common to blacklist opponents and to use this practice as a tool of political struggle. Due to this each Chancellor was associated with certain groups of officials. On assuming power he had to purge the stuff of his predecessor to promote his own people.

For a rank and file of a certain faction the political controversy was of secondary importance. The main thing was to consolidate his own position. The inter party struggle was always a fierce one, for the deposed faction cherished a revenge.

It is evident that the inter party struggle practised in the medieval China resembles the factional struggle within the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.

Islamization of East Africa: Swahili Ethnic and Cultural History,  
[Author] N. S. Illarionov

Swahili ethnic and cultural history represents a case of a cross cultural civilization development. The islamization of the East African coast dates back to the 7th century. It was at this time that the principal Swahili institutions came into existence and had their bearing upon the process of development.

The analysis of historical sources testifies that most of the Bantu were Moslem by the 10th century. A tradition of Moslem settlement was established along the entire coast. Islam intermingled with the local Bantu culture. The emerging Swahili civilization absorbed various ethnic elements. The changes and innovations, however, did not interrupt the continuity of the preislamic Zing tradition. The Swahili history of the discussed period corroborates that the islamization of the early class societies does not lead towards predetermined pattern of development. On the contrary, islamization, as such, provides an ample opportunity for different patterns of development in each particular case.

The Moslem forms of the superstructure, novel as they may be, do not produce revolutionary changes in mass consciousness and social psychology. Once adapted to the latter, they undergo modification together.

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## ARABIAN WORLD: RESOURCES AND INEQUALITIES IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 82 pp 18-28

[Article by S. L. Stoklitskiy, candidate of economic sciences, scientific associate of the USSR Academy of Science's Institute of Eastern Studies and specialist on socio-economic problems in the countries of the Arab East: "The Arabian World: Resources and Inequalities in Economic Development"]

[Text] The processes of inequality in the economic development and the resulting intensive economic differentiation in the Arab world<sup>1</sup> are impressive. It is enough to look at the differences in the pace of development of the region's various countries, as well as at the indicators that characterize the distribution of the final public product. During the 1970's the average annual growth pace of VVP [Gross national product] per capita comprised 7.8 percent in Saudi Arabia and did not exceed 1 percent in the Sudan.<sup>2</sup> By the end of the 1970's Saudi Arabia had concentrated over 26 percent of the VVP produced within the Arab world within its own country whereas its proportion among the area's population hardly exceeded 5 percent.<sup>3</sup>

The analysis of economics in the Arab world usually results in a division of the region into oil-exporting and other nations. This can be satisfying only during the first look at the problem of economic differentiation. The point is not only that the inequality in development is a multi-factor phenomenon based on the interaction of a complex of social and economic conditions of a national and international order. With such an approach one cannot make a distinction between oil-producing countries themselves. Such a coarse division of the Arab world also does not consider the totality of resource-economic potentials in their various combinations.

Also characteristic of the Arab world is the clearly defined inequality in the distribution of the entire complex of basic production resources--labor, mineral and raw materials, land and of course fuel and energy. As a rule a high concentration of some of these resources in a single country is usually accompanied by an acute shortage or absence of other resources. This is the reason for the constant and persistent lack of balance between the availability of a resource and the demand for it. This cannot but have an effect on the economic development of individual countries and on the region as a whole.

When dividing the Arab countries into oil-exporters and oil-importers it is important to consider the basic differences between the countries comprising each group. Among the oil-producing nations there is a clearly defined hierarchy. Two countries--Saudi Arabia and Kuwait--had 68 percent of all reserves and produced 38 percent of Arab oil in the early 1980's.<sup>4</sup> These countries as well as Qatar and the Arab Emirates differ from the other oil-producing countries in the absolute reserves they own as well as in reserves per individual in the population. Judging by everything this gap will remain for a long time. Supporting this assumption is the indicator of the annual reserve factor (the ratio of reserves to the annual output level, expressed in years). In the early 1980's in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia this indicator comprised 72 and 47 years respectively, which significantly surpassed the average indicator for the oil-producing economy of the entire Arab world (30 years). In countries such as Algeria and Iraq, as a result of the intensive exploitation of liquid fuel sources the annual reserve factor dropped to 22 and 25 years respectively, i.e. it was lower than the average level for the region.<sup>5</sup>

Of course we must also consider the historical limitations to the aforementioned values. As a rule reserves increase according to improved methods of geological prospecting and to increased demand for fuel and energy in commerce and production as deposits that were previously unprofitable to exploit are exploited. In the Arab world oil is being sought everywhere--in countries where it has already been discovered and those where it has not yet been found. As a result oil-bearing regions have been discovered in areas that were previously considered unpromising, as for example in North Yemen and Sudan. There has also been a significant growth in fuel reserves in Oman. The existing situation can change dramatically if large amounts of oil and gas are produced from the continental shelves of countries with sea boundaries.

Despite these hopes related to the search for new sources, the situation that developed in the late 1970's to early 1980's will demand, in all probability, that all oil-producing nations regulate their oil production more strictly in the future.

Here other problems arise. Many oil-exporters face a dilemma today. Decreasing the pace of oil extraction would mean (all other conditions being equal) weakening business activity which is stimulated by oil sales on the international market. Maintaining the current pace of oil extraction would in a number of cases mean risking the material and financial base of the national economy before help could be brought to the relatively isolated oil-extracting industry by branches that are more closely linked to the local economy, such as the petrochemical industry.

Under these conditions many Arab states, while mobilizing their efforts to develop modern industry, are trying to more actively diversify their raw materials and fuel-energy base. Thus, Iraq, Libya, Qatar and especially Algeria, which have large gas deposits, are striving to put them into production circulation and at the same time to compensate for the tendency of a dropping annual reserve factor of liquid petroleum.

The level of supplies of key energy sources such as oil and gas in the Arab world greatly predetermines the balance between the production of primary energy

resources and the consumption of energy. In this regard three groups of countries can be singled out in the Arab East.<sup>6</sup> The first group includes the main net-exporters of primary energy resources--Saudi Arabia, the Arab Emirates, Oman, Libya, Kuwait, Qatar, Iraq and Algeria. During the second half of the 1970's over 60 percent of the oil produced by these countries was exported. The second group includes Syria, Tunisia, Egypt and Bahrain--countries that not only fully supply themselves with primary energy resources but which also export a portion of these--58 percent (Syria) and 36 percent (Bahrain). The third group of countries includes Morocco, ~~Lebanon~~, Sudan, Mauritania, Djibouti, Somalia, Jordan, NDRY [National Democratic Republic of Yemen], and YAR [Yemen Arab Republic]. These countries are net importers of energy resources. Imports cover over 80 percent of their need for energy and fuel.

At the same time during 1960-1970 and especially 1970-1976 a number of countries noted a tendency toward a decrease in the proportion of liquid petroleum in the export of energy resources. The reason for this phenomenon should be sought first of all in the increasing pace of energy consumption everywhere as compared with energy production. Thus, in Saudi Arabia in 1973-1976 the average annual pace of increased consumption comprised 17.8 percent whereas the pace of increased production was only 4.4 percent; in Algeria--19.1 and 3.3 percent respectively. This also applies to countries like Oman, which until recently maintained the Arabian routine of the Middle Ages. In this country the indicators we are discussing equalled 56 and 7.7 percent respectively. The rapid growth of energy consumption in the 1970's was evidently based on two factors--first, on the energy activities of the majority of the region's countries in modernizing the national economy and in developing large energy-consuming industries; second, on the active attempt to habituate large masses to the use of energy in its various forms.

If the countries with relatively small supplies of liquid petroleum continue to be faced with consumption surpassing production then in the future (with a maintenance of current annual reserve factors) it is possible that some countries will move from the second into the third group. Thus, in Bahrain, where oil has been produced since 1934, the rapid pace of average annual increased consumption in the 1970's was related primarily to the introduction into operation of large energy-consuming industries. The result of this was a decrease in the proportion of Bahrain exports of primary energy resources.

A similar fate may be met by the rest of the oil exporters of the second group--Syria, Tunisia and Egypt. In the late 1960's to early 1970's all three of these countries became net exporters of fuel as a result of the energetic exploitation of fuel sources. But at the same time that output was increasing the pace of consumption also increased. The intensive development of oil sources with a relatively greater level of industrial development has noticeably hindered export possibilities. A drop in the proportion of exported fuel, which occupies an important place in the export market structure, can in turn have extremely unfavorable effects on the currency-financial situation of the aforementioned countries.

The shortage of local energy sources requires the countries in the third group to spend significant amounts of currency on imports. But even among oil importers



conditions are far from uniform. A number of countries, especially Morocco, can expect a certain easing of fuel-energy difficulties and an equalization of the trade balance by introducing other mineral resources, such as phosphates, in the world market. Northern Yemen and Jordan and several other countries can count on the influx of currency from guest workers for at least a short period of time. As for the other countries in the region which do not have their own sources of energy, their main means of equalizing the fuel-energy balance is usually a strict control over energy consumption and mutual loans. The possibilities for economic development are naturally narrowed.

The contrasts in the differentiation within the Arab world regarding fuel and energy resources are mitigated only insignificantly by the export of other types of mineral raw materials for two reasons. Firstly, the selection of other useful minerals that can be processed and exported is very limited. At the present time in the region there are only phosphates and to a certain degree, iron ore. Secondly, no other useful mineral available to the Arab countries can compete with oil. This applies to phosphates as well although the region has a very solid position in the world economy in the extraction and export of phosphates--at the end of the 1970's the proportion of Arab phosphate on the world market reached 30 percent, of which 21 percent came from Morocco.<sup>7</sup> But phosphates do not have the unique and universally desirable properties of oil, and the developed capitalist world, the main consumer of phosphates, has many of its own large reserves (USA) and can seriously affect market competition. This is one of the reasons for the lesser effectiveness than OPEC of the Organization of Phosphate Exporting Nations formed in 1976 (this includes Algeria, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, Togo and Senegal). As concerns iron ore, the position of Arab countries here is even more modest.

The differentiation of the Arab world in regard to resource-economic potential acquires an even more complex configuration if we consider the noticeable differences among countries for developing agriculture and primarily agricultural lands (Table 1).

As a rule large land areas that can be used for agriculture are available to countries (with the exception of Iraq) which do not have large oil reserves--Syria, Tunisia, Morocco and Jordan.

The interrelationship of land resources and factors of economic potential such as population introduces additional corrections into the position of Arab countries with respect to each other without changing the basic nature of the existing hierarchy. Tunisia, Syria, Jordan and Iraq continue to move ahead of other countries. At the same time in agricultural potential the leading "four" are followed closely by Sudan, Algeria and Morocco. In all of the aforementioned countries at the beginning of the 1980's there were 0.4 hectares of tilled soil per person of the population. This is about double the indicators characteristic for the remainder of the countries that are not oil exporters--Somalia, YAR and NDRY and several dozen times greater than those for the oil-producing countries of the Arab world. An exception is Egypt, where 0.07 hectares are tilled per each member of the population.

Table 1  
Cultivated Soil and Grain Productivity in the Arab World  
(End 1970's)

Countries	Cultivated Lands		Proportion of Irrigated Land (%)	Productivity of Grains (Kilograms per Hectare)
	Compared to Entire Land Area (%)	Amount of Land per Person (ha)		
Syria	31.9	0.68	7.6	1131
Tunisia	28.9	0.73	2.9	607
Iraq	23.4	0.43	21.9	984
Morocco	17.8	0.41	5.9	914
Jordan	12.3	0.46	44.0	426
YAR	7.7	0.28	15.0	784
Bahrain	5.8	0.01	50	1000
Sudan	3.0	0.43	20.6	648
Egypt	2.8	0.07	100	3579
Algeria	2.8	0.42	9.6	599
Somalia	1.5	0.28	15.4	509
NDRY	0.9	0.15	21.8	1620
Saudi Arabia	0.4	0.13	35	1088
Oman	0.2	0.05	83.3	1438
Arab Emirates	0.15	0.01	45	1000
Qatar	0.08	0.02	100	1000
Kuwait	0.04	0.01	100	1230

Calculated according to: FAO. Production Yearbook 1978. Vol. 32. Rome, 1979, p. 45-66, 93, 94; "FAO. Monthly Bulletin of Statistics". Rome, 1981, vol. 4, March 1981, p. 30, D. G. Edens. Oil and Development in the Middle East. N.Y., 1979, p. 7-8.

Because of the unfavorable climatic conditions and primarily because of the rare precipitation, in most of the regions of the Arab world only irrigated farming is feasible, especially where there is a small amount of land per person. Not accidentally the proportion of irrigated land was greatest in Qatar, Kuwait and Egypt. Moreover, the cost of water, especially under the conditions found on the Arabian peninsula, is very high. For example, in Saudi Arabia, where according to geological studies there are considerable reserves of underground water resources, the cost of available water is triple that of water taken from above-ground sources.<sup>8</sup> With current technology it is still too expensive to desalinate sea water. Nevertheless, with the steady growth of petrodollars and improved desalination technology the larger oil exporters will in principle be in a position to finance the growth of their agrarian potential. If we consider the small population and the circumstances that limit immigration there we must come to the conclusion that the agrarian sector in these countries can be transformed into a capital-intensive industry with active development.

Other problems of land use are faced by countries with relatively small areas of land to work and with no possibility of irrigating the land with "petrodollar rain." Especially acute is the problem of land hunger in the most populated country of the region--Egypt. The cultivated land in Egypt, almost all of it irrigated, is highly productive. As we can see from Table 1, during the second half of the 1970's the productivity of grains there almost reached USA levels (39.8 quintals per hectare) and greatly surpassed the level of other Arabian nations. The high productivity in Egypt was secured primarily through the intensive utilization of labor resources. Whereas in the mid-1970's in most of the Arab countries no more than 33 persons worked on 1 square kilometer, in Egypt the figure was 153.<sup>9</sup> Since that time the gap between countries in this regard, taking into account the characteristics of population growth, has only increased. At the present time the saturation of agriculture in Egypt with labor resources has reached such a level that any new influx of workers for agriculture cannot be absorbed and the surplus labor overflows into the cities.

No less important is another circumstance and it is characteristic for the agricultural production not only of Egypt but of many other countries in the region--Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, ~~Lebanon~~ and Sudan. Their market agriculture is oriented toward the export of long-fiber cotton (Egypt, the Sudan), early vegetables, fruits, citrus products (countries of Maghrib, ~~Lebanon~~) and so forth whereas until recently no attention has been given to the production of basic foodstuffs consumed by the local population. Thus because of the mechanism of the world capitalist market on which a large quantity of the commodity products are sold the agricultural specialization of these countries is consolidated and requires them to import many mass nutritional products.

A study of the balance of grain production and consumption in the countries of the region shows that in the late 1970's only three of them--the Sudan, Syria and Morocco--had a deficit lower than 25 percent in foodstuffs consumption; all of the other countries imported from 30 (YAR) to 80 percent and more (leading oil exporters) of essential foodstuffs.<sup>10</sup>

The exacerbation of the foodstuffs problem was related not only to differences in the levels of national production but also to the growth of per capita consumption, especially noticeable in the oil-exporting countries. But in all cases the dependence of the region's countries on the capitalist world food market either remained the same or increased.

During the 1970's in the Arab world as a whole the curve representing the import of foodstuffs rose persistently. According to our calculations, the annual deficit in the foodstuffs balance of the region grew from 25 million tons at the beginning of the decade to 36 million tons by its end and the proportion of this deficit in consumption increased on the average from 20 to 32 percent.<sup>11</sup> The currency expenditures for the purchase of foodstuffs abroad increased even more significantly than the indicators for the physical volume because food prices on the world market had a tendency to rise during the 1970's. Expenditures were even higher than assumed by the alarming prognosis of the MBRR [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development] (according to this prognosis in 1985 alone the deficit of basic foodstuffs in the Near East and North Africa would reach 15 million tons or 19.8 percent of total food consumption as compared with 10 million tons or 15.9 percent in 1976).<sup>12</sup>



The overall (although differing in degree) exacerbation of the food problem in Arab countries is replete with serious consequences. Its solution by increasing imports is only a pacifier, although this means will be important for a long time to come, especially for oil exporters. The supply of food to the Arab East is becoming an important political and economic weapon in the hands of the West. The principle expressed by Washington still in the early 1970's, "a bushel of wheat for a barrel of oil," is one of the more odious manifestations of this pressure.

It is generally assumed that unemployment is an unchangeable characteristic of the backward and dependent economy of a developing nation. In these countries the labor supply usually exceeds demand, giving rise to various forms of idleness. The reality of the Arab world does not fit into this stereotype. In this regard the Arab countries vary widely, including in the chronic shortage of work force.

Two main factors provide the key to understanding the differentiation. First there is the high degree of concentration of an important component of the economic potential of Arab countries, labor resources. In five of the largest countries--Egypt, Morocco, Algiers, the Sudan and Iraq--during the second half of the 1970's we found 70 percent of the 150 million living in the region as compared to less than 5 percent concentrated in the NDRY, Mauritania, Kuwait, Qatar, the Arab Emirates, Djibouti and Bahrain. With this basis for comparison the YAR, Somalia, Jordan, Lebanon and Libya, countries with populations of from 2.6 to 5 million,<sup>13</sup> seem to be relatively large and well populated.

In the same way the Arab countries differ in labor resources since because of the similarity of ethnographic and demographic factors the proportion of the active population, according to the observations of United Nations experts, comprised 25-30 percent of the indigenous population during the second half of the 1970's.<sup>14</sup>

Secondly, there is an asymmetry in the concentration of demand and supply of labor resources and of both untrained workers and specialists. The fact is that the fuel and energy reserves of the Arab world and the accompanying demand for workers resulting from the oil "boom" are concentrated in certain countries, as we have seen, whereas "surplus" labor is concentrated in others. Basically we can speak only of Iraq as a country in which there is some sort of balance (in comparison with other Arab countries) between labor supply and demand.

The concentration of surplus labor in some countries of the Arab world and unsatisfied demand in others has resulted in a mass migration of workers.<sup>15</sup> Foreign workers are imported by the Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Bahrain and even Oman. Constant exporters of workers to the Persian Gulf as well as to Libya are Jordan (from which Palestinians living here also migrate), YAR, Syria, Egypt and the Sudan.<sup>16</sup>

The mobile labor resources are included in different ways in the economies of the two groups of countries. For the sparsely populated countries that are oil exporters the active utilization of a foreign work force is related to a

high level of production activity. However, the leadership circles of feudal Arabian monarchies are afraid of an increased participation by immigrants in the economy that might undermine their position in economic as well as social and political life. This was the reason for attempts by the governments to strictly regulate the influx of foreign labor during the second half of the 1970's. This, however, hinders the growth of their production apparatus.

As concerns countries with a relative surplus of labor, for them the emigration of the work force voluntarily or involuntarily became a type of export branch of the economy, the role of which in some cases is very great. In the YAR and Jordan, for example, the transfer of emigrants grew quickly and by 1977 surpassed 32 percent of the country's GNP.<sup>17</sup> However, the continued increase in emigration to Arab importers of workers will probably become limited on the part of the recipient countries. The export of labor to the West is extremely difficult first because of the existence of serious language and socio-cultural barriers and second because of the limits placed on industrial development in capitalist countries during the crisis years (1970's to early 1980's) and on the import of cheap unskilled labor.

A complete understanding about the economic importance of particular factors with resource-economic potential and the degree of their assimilation can be elicited from indicators of the final social product (in this case the VVP [GNP]). The GNP in its turn makes the decisive contribution toward the annual growth of national riches, attesting to the absolute economic strength of a particular country. Nevertheless even with this view of the situation in the Arab East the concentration and polarization of resources remain the main characteristics in distributing the GNP in the region (Table 2).

As we can see from Table 2 almost 25 percent of the 1976 total GNP for Arab states is concentrated in the Arab Emirates, Qatar, Libya, Bahrain, whereas their share of the population does not exceed 4 percent. If we add Saudi Arabia to the aforementioned countries, whose proportion of population is 5.1 percent and proportion of GNP is over 26 percent, it turns out that over half of the region's GNP is concentrated in the hands of the richer "five" countries.

The poor countries have their own concentration. Mauritania, the Sudan, the YAR, Somalia and the NDRY, where almost one-fifth of the region's population lives, produces only 5 percent of the regional GNP. If we include Egypt here, with its concentration of one-fourth of the population of the Arab East, we find that the countries with the lowest indicators for per capita GNP produce only 15 percent of the total regional GNP although 45 percent of the population lives there. Only in some countries, such as Iraq, Algeria, Lebanon, Syria and Tunisia, the proportion of the population does not diverge quite so sharply from participation in the GNP.

A somewhat different gradation can be observed if we look at GNP without regard to the level of per capita production.<sup>18</sup> In this case Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Iraq, Egypt, Libya, and also Kuwait produce over seven tenths of the Arab GNP. Saudi Arabia is the leader in the production of the absolute GNP volume (about 44 billion dollars). This is more than 2.5 times larger than the

Table 2  
Distribution According to Country of the Total  
GNP in the Arabian World (1976)

Country	Per Capita GNP (\$)	Proportion of population in the Arab world (%)		Proportion in Total GNP		Ratio of Proportion of Population to Proportion of Total GNP
		-	Cumulative	-	Cumulative	
Arab Emirates	13990	0.4	0.4	5.9	5.9	0.06
Qatar	13638	0.6	1.0	1.7	7.6	0.35
Kuwait	11790	0.7	1.7	7.4	15.0	0.09
Libya	5643	1.9	3.6	8.6	23.6	0.08
Bahrain	4425	0.2	3.8	0.7	24.3	0.28
Saudi Arabia	4754	5.1	8.9	26.6	50.9	0.19
Oman	2935	0.5	9.4	1.4	52.3	0.35
Iraq	1363	8.2	17.6	9.5	61.8	0.82
Algeria	954	11.6	29.2	9.9	71.7	1.17
Syria	777	5.2	34.4	4.0	75.7	1.3
Tunisia	775	3.9	38.3	2.7	78.4	1.4
Djibouti	702	0.3	38.6	0.1	78.5	3.0
Lebanon	495	2.2	40.8	2.0	80.5	1.1
Morocco	453	12.3	53.1	4.9	85.4	2.5
Jordan	434	2.1	55.2	0.7	86.1	3.0
Egypt	396	25.5	80.7	9.0	95.1	2.8
Mauritania	322	1.0	81.7	0.3	95.4	3.3
Sudan	314	11.4	93.1	3.0	98.4	3.8
YAR	270	3.3	96.4	1.1	99.5	3.0
Somalia	169	2.5	98.9	0.4	99.9	6.25
NDRY	167	1.1	100.0	0.1	100.0	5.5

Calculated according to: HITDS, 1979, p. 473-477; Political Handbook..., p. 612-614; "IMF. International Financial Statistics," Washington, 1980, No 4.

corresponding indicators for Algeria, which is in second place according to GNP size. For the rest of the members of the "big six" the GNP size differs insignificantly, reaching at least 12.1 billion dollars (Kuwait).

For the next six countries--the Arab Emirates, Morocco, Syria, the Sudan, Tunisia and Lebanon--the absolute size of the GNP is from 3 to 10 billion dollars. It is characteristic that whereas in the first group all of the countries with the exception of Egypt belong to the category of large oil exporters, in the second group the oil exporters are represented only by the Arab Emirates. Most of the countries in this group are countries in which oil plays an insignificant role in development or none at all.

The distribution of countries in the subsequent two groups essentially repeats the situation, at a lower level, found in the upper two groups in the Arab world. In the group in which the absolute GNP size is 1-3 billion dollars we find Qatar, Oman, Bahrain, the YAR and Jordan. The two latter countries are included not accidentally with the oil-producing countries. As we have already seen, they obtain a large proportion of their resources from the transfer of emigrants from the zone of intensive oil production. The final group is composed of Mauritania, the NDRY, and Djibouti, countries with an extremely insignificant (with the exception to a certain degree of Mauritania) industrial development of natural resources.

The economic practices of the countries of the Arab East demonstrate that the unique combinations of natural resource factors in economic growth logically give rise to differences in the elaboration of a national strategy for development. At the same time it is important to emphasize another characteristic factor. In all the cases examined, regardless of the range of available resources, for the Arab countries it is difficult to overestimate the importance of mineral raw materials, population and other components of economic potential. The general economic backwardness of the region is manifest in the fact that the key branches of material production maintain a direct tie to the natural environment.

This last factor is the basis for many similar elements in the economic strategies for the development of the Arab East. Thus, for all Arab countries without exception the path toward expanding their resource potential remains one of the most important conditions and directions of development. This results in the careful attention given to finding new sources of liquid petroleum, gas, and minerals and to developing new lands. Special emphasis is placed on the use of irreplaceable resources, and primarily petroleum. The course toward a more effective and complete utilization of existing raw material reserves is being coordinated with an expansion of the assortment of petrochemical products, with a growth in fertilizer production, etc. At the same time the leading oil exporters are making efforts not only to transform their resource potential into a production potential but to also meet their own needs for fuel and energy. This explains the energetic steps taken by Iraq, Libya and a number of other countries to develop nuclear electric stations and the general interest in the region in the utilization of solar power.

With this in mind it is especially noticeable that existing natural riches have different effects on the hierarchy of countries in the Arab world as regards resource-economic potential. The availability of fuel and energy raw materials has the most obvious effect on particular countries. The availability of surplus workers, relatively favorable conditions for agriculture as well as an advantageous geographic position can hardly compensate for the absence or shortage of basic energy resources.<sup>19</sup>

At the same time, development that is based on the exploitation of a single resource, even one such as oil, is one-sided and confining. It is one-sided because with a small population in many of the countries of the Arabian peninsula and consequently with the small internal market for mass production of many consumer and industrial goods development that is oriented toward export



essentially has no realistic alternatives. The surplus of oil on the world market that developed in 1980-1981 complicated sales conditions for this unique commodity and forced countries to decrease the production of raw petroleum. This resulted in a curtailment of exports in most OPEC countries. It is apparent that the fate of exports of Arabian petrochemicals and fertilizers, which occupy a modest place on the world market, is related to strengthening competition, not to speak of the vicissitudes of demand.

The most favorable combination of prerequisites for development are created when there is a certain balance of fuel-energy, labor, agricultural and other resources in a specific country. If we consider the specifics of resource distribution in the Arab world as discussed above then it becomes apparent that one of the most promising ways to utilize the resources is to increase regional cooperation. If we look at individual countries, the most favorable are the economic and geographical conditions of Iraq. In the early 1980's this country had a large fuel-energy base, a sufficient land fund and a multitude of labor resources. Despite a few problems we feel that there is a favorable balance of various resource components in Syria and Tunisia as well, although their absolute indicators are somewhat lower than those of Iraq. The indicated combination of resources opens up possibilities for these countries for freer economic maneuvers, for an effective development of labor-intensive as well as capital-intensive industries as needed and for selecting (or coordinating) an orientation toward export or import.

Another factor is also important--the effect of selecting a socio-political path of development to effectively utilize a particular resource-economic potential. In the given case one type of differentiation, namely socio-political, interacts with its other manifestations. Without going into the details of this problem, which deserves special examination, let us note that the availability of petroleum and of an oil-producing industry in countries such as Algeria significantly eases problem solving involving the destruction of old socio-economic structures on the basis of progressive non-capitalistic beginnings. The oil-producing industry is the main materialistic support for the building of a new society on revolutionary democratic principles. It is not accidental that in countries like this in the Arab East there arose a movement to establish effective sovereignty over national natural riches, and the development of public forms of management within the branches of the oil-producing industry, agriculture and international trade has become a priority for the governments.

The positive effects of the progressive selection of a public means of development were evident in those countries with the least favorable combination of natural-resources conditions in the Arab world (Somalia, YAR, Sudan, NDRY, Djibouti). The first four countries of this group, as we know, were categorized by the U.N. among the least developed according to the level of production forces. Nevertheless, as the practical experience of South Yemen, for example, indicates even under such limited conditions it is possible to successfully deal with the most acute problems of development. Suffice it to say that in the NDRY the accumulation norm increased from 3 percent in 1970 to 31 percent in 1977 as a result of introducing progressive socio-economic changes. The pace of growth in GNP production in 1970/1979 comprised 4.8 percent.<sup>20</sup> Thus,

by releasing the creative energy of the masses and by selecting a progressive orientation for development it is possible to replace a backward and dependent national economy with powerful social developmental forces.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. The article analyzes the status of countries belonging to the League of Arab States.
2. UNCTAD. Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics (further--HITDS). 1980. Supplement. N.Y., 1981, Table 6. 2.
3. Calculated according to: HITDS, 1979, pp 473-477; Political Handbook of the World, 1979. N.Y., 1979, pp 612-614.
4. Calculated according to: BIKI. Supplement, 1980, pp 180-183; OPEC Oil Report, Nov 79, L., 1980, pp 84-85, 176.
5. Ibid.
6. Here and further calculated and grouped according to: HITDS, 1979, Table 6. 9.
7. BIKI. 3. 1. 1980.
8. D. G. Edens. Oil and Development in the Middle East, p 11.
9. Ibid., p 12.
10. Calculated according to: FAO. Production Yearbook. 1978, vol. 32, pp 45-66; "FAO. Monthly Bulletin of Statistics," Vol 4, Mar 81, p 30.
11. Ibid.
12. World Bank Development Report 1979. Washington, 1979, p 22.
13. Calculated according to: Political Handbook... pp 612-614.
14. This does not signify the complete similarity of all demographic characteristics of population growth, of course. Thus, the annual pace of population growth in Algeria comprised an average of 3.2 percent in 1970-1976, whereas in neighboring Tunisia the figure was 2.4 percent (see U.N.E.C.W.A. Demographic and Related Socio-Economic Data Sheets for Countries of the Economic Commission for Western Asia. Beirut, 1978).
15. For more details see: A. N. Kamenskiy, "The Migration of the Work Force in the Arab East," NARODY AZII I AFRIKI, 1982, No 1, pp 79-90.
16. Workers are also exported by Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. Most of the workers from these countries go to Western Europe.

17. Calculated according to: J. I. Birks and C. A. Sinclair, International Migration and Development in the Arab Region, Geneva, 1980. pp 132, 136, 138, 142, 144.
18. Calculated according to: HITDS, 1979, pp 473-477; "IMF. International Financial Statistics," 1980, No 4.
19. For Lebanon and Bahrain and to a lesser degree for the NDRY and Djibouti a type of resource is their advantageous geographical position, which has left its mark on the structure of their economic development. These countries have long played the role of transit and transfer points, serving trade routes within the region as well as outside it. In addition, Lebanon and Bahrain have the functions of regional banking centers.
20. U.N. Democratic Yemen. Country Review, LDC/C.P./ 4 January 1981, p 25.

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## POLITICAL, SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND TO 1978 AFGHAN REVOLUTION

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 82 pp 28-37

[Article by N. M. Gurevich: "Prerevolutionary Crisis in Afghanistan"]

[Text] Prior to the revolution of 1978 Afghanistan was one of the most backward countries of the world. The main branch of the economy was agriculture, but the farming economies were usually small parcels utilizing medieval agro-technology and agriculture and the basis for livestock raising, yielding about half of gross agricultural production, was pasture livestock raising. Feudal relations, exacerbated by pre-feudal remnants, predominated in the agrarian structure. The volume of agricultural production per capita was much lower than in most other Asian countries. In Afghanistan there was practically no factory-plant industry; industrial production (including handicrafts) comprised an insignificant portion of the national product. Most of the population was illiterate and there was almost a complete absence of engineers, doctors and other specialists.

Until the 1950's the military organization of Afghanistan was very backward, with a basis in tribal militias, a form going back many centuries. During the years of WW II the Afghan government, overcoming the opposition of tribal leaders, was able for the first time (in October 1941) to introduce compulsory military service. However, the formation of a regular army met with difficulties. The technical equipment of the army was very antiquated and there were practically no airplanes, tanks and other modern equipment. The military weakness of Afghanistan became especially apparent in 1947, when Afghanistan's international situation became more complicated in connection with the so-called Pushtunistan problem--the struggle of millions of Afghans living in Pakistan for national self-determination, a struggle that was supported by the leadership of Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, despite stupefying government propaganda, reports on events developing outside Afghanistan began to reach the people more and more. The successes of socialist construction in the neighboring Soviet Union had a great effect on the political mood of workers. "The sharp contrast with the situation in Soviet Central Asia," wrote an American specialist on Afghanistan, "is an important factor encouraging rapid development."<sup>1</sup> As a result of the breakdown of the colonial system of imperialism Asian and African peoples moved toward the path of independent development one after another, breaking down barriers to economic



growth and realizing a social and social-political reconstruction of their countries. In Afghanistan there was an increase in the population's dissatisfaction with the governing Nadir dynasty.

In 1953 there was a cabinet change in the country and the king's cousin, M. Daud, became the prime minister. As the subsequent activities of the new government showed, it tried to solve two problems--to achieve a more rapid pace of economic growth and to modernize the army. The new government strengthened its support of the Afghan movement abroad and this resulted in even more tension with Pakistan. In 1955 an administrative reform took place in Pakistan and as a result a single province of West Pakistan was formed, including the Afghans of the northwest border area. Then Pakistan forbade the shipping of Afghan goods through its territory which resulted in great losses for Afghanistan's economy. In September 1955 Pakistan entered the Baghdad Pact (CENTO since 1958).<sup>2</sup> The events of 1953-1955 further strengthened the significance of M. Daud's program. In November 1955 a decision was made "to strengthen and arm the country for defense by any possible means."<sup>3</sup>

Large financial resources were necessary for realizing the government's program. During the preceding decade private national capital had increased significantly, but it functioned primarily in the sphere of circulation with great profits and all government attempts to divert it into the production sphere remained unsuccessful. It was thus impossible to count on any type of serious participation of the private sector in the indicated plans for long-term capital building. There was even less hope for government finances. Income from taxes was very small, most taxes came from workers and the government could not increase taxes because of the poverty of the masses and the fear of political reprisals. Deficit financing could also yield little, which also undermined the budget's tax base.

The government decided to seek some of the necessary financial resources in the state sector. Taxes on profits from international trade were increased, particularly those received by the Afghanistan National Bank, the strongest organization of the private sector. The government also went to the "printing press." However, the most important source for covering budget expenditures for the economy and for military needs became outside financial and economic aid. The Afghan government turned to the USSR, the USA, other countries and international organizations for help and received a considerable amount of credit. This enabled the government to begin the first five-year plan in 1956.

In the course of the first three five-year plans the government spent 53 billion afghans for economic development alone<sup>4</sup>--a sum that greatly exceeded the amount of the annual national product. About 3,000 kilometers of paved roads were built in the country to join the major regions of Afghanistan and to provide access to neighboring countries. A number of hydroelectric and factory-plant enterprises were constructed, a network of airports was created, and so forth. The large growth of state expenditures for economic development resulted in a significant expansion of the state sector in the economy. The state realized almost all of the road-transportation and hydropower building, played a decisive role in the development of factories and plants and of the credit system, held a significant portion of international trade in its hands and financed the entire system of training cadres.

However, already during the years of the first five-year plan voices of disagreement were heard within the Nadir dynasty. A group headed by Shah Zakh became more and more critical of some aspects of the national and international policies of M. Daud's government. This had to do primarily with receiving a great deal of outside aid and its possible political and financial consequences. The opponents of M. Daud cautioned against expanding the state sector in the economy, which resulted in a deceleration of accumulation of capital within the private sector and a general weakening of the private sector's role in the economy. An exacerbation of Afghan-Pakistani relations because of the Pushtunistan problem weakened the position of the governing group in the international arena and within the country. The differences of opinion also reflected the struggle between Shah Zakhir and M. Daud for power and influence within the country.<sup>6</sup> In general these were tactical differences regarding the selection of a particular national or international policy that would best satisfy the interests of the feudal landowner class that had put the Nadir dynasty into power.

In 1963 the group of Shah Zakhir forced M. Daud's government into retirement. In subsequent years economic ties with the USSR were somewhat limited, which resulted in a decrease in external financial and economic aid coming into Afghanistan. This occurred despite the fact that during this period, the late 1960's, the gas deposits developed with Soviet aid began to be exploited, enabling Afghanistan to repay its debt to the USSR. Measures were taken to create more possibilities for accumulating capital in the private sector and to generally activate its role in the economy as well as to recruit private foreign capital into the country. The new government moved toward improving relations with Pakistan and negotiated to restore the transit of Afghan goods through Pakistani territory. Trade between Afghanistan and the developed capitalist countries became more active.

These achievements, however, had more of a negative than a positive effect for the governing group and for the whole country. A decrease in external financial and economic aid resulted in a decrease in capital investments into the economy and in a deceleration in the pace of economic growth.<sup>6</sup> The financial and economic aid given to Afghanistan by foreign governments and international organizations was not utilized fully. As a result the 3d Five-Year Plan (1967-1971) remained unfulfilled to a significant degree. The hopes to increase the norm of internal accumulation with the aid of the private sector remained unjustified. Despite the fact that as a result of the measures taken to provide incentives, this sector activated its participation in the production sphere after 1963, it could not make up for the losses related to the curtailment of foreign aid.

During the years of the five-year plans most of the resources were spent on modernizing the army, on developing transportation and industry and a relatively small amount on agriculture. Even the resources spent on irrigation building did not greatly increase the area of irrigated land for a number of reasons. In a country such as Afghanistan, where 85 percent of the population worked in agriculture the per capita production volume within this branch and the nature of agrarian relations determining the distribution of agricultural goods formed the main elements of the economy, the social structure, the material status of most of the population, and the internal political situation. In

addition, agricultural production, constrained by a feudal system, grew more slowly than the population and in some years as a result primarily of drought resulting in poor harvests and the loss of livestock, it did not grow at all or experienced an absolute decrease.<sup>7</sup>

Although during the period under examination livestock raising was transformed from a nomadic and semi-nomadic state to one of pasturing, per capita production output of livestock products dropped in the post-war period. This resulted primarily from changes in the ratio between the livestock-raising and farming populations because of the natural rapid growth pace of the farming population and because many nomads settled down to a farming life. The feed base for livestock raising began to diminish as the best pastures were plowed up for farmland. The country has many unutilized pastures, but livestock was not taken there because of the shortage of water sources there. The weak feed base, the absence of shelter for animals during the winter, frequent episodes of illness among the animals served to diminish the herd each year. The periodic years of drought reduced the herd catastrophically.

The most valuable animals in the herd were the karakul sheep. During the years between the world wars because of the advantages of selling karakul abroad there was an extensive crossbreeding of sheep bred for meat and wool purposes with karakul sheep. The herd of karakul sheep grew and beginning in the 1920's and 1930's karakul comprised from one-third to one-fourth of sheep herds. However, there was a simultaneous growth in the slaughter of karakul lambs for the purpose of producing karakul. Judging on export data (almost all karakul was exported) up to 2 million animals were slaughtered annually. The slaughter of karakul young hindered the growth of small horned and all livestock. A country that in the past was an exporter of large quantities of livestock on the hoof began to experience difficulties in supplying its own population with meat, and the export of wool decreased by half over the 50-60 years.

Farming also faced difficult problems. The growing farm population assimilated new lands, but in a country in which a great deal of the land is made up of rocky hills, these were primarily low-productivity lands requiring artificial irrigation. The irrigation potential of small rivers and streams was evidently exhausted; there could have been a considerable growth in production by irrigating lands using water from larger rivers (if we do not consider well irrigation utilizing modern technical resources, which would not have been developed in pre-revolutionary Afghanistan). But little was done in this regard. The hydropower construction in the Gil'mendskaya Valley by the American company Morrison-Nadsen utilized too many resources and brought about very modest gains. For this reason the proportion of non-irrigated land in total assimilated land continued to grow. Productivity is very low on such lands and harvests are extremely unstable.

In accordance with existing figures (in pre-revolutionary Afghanistan there were practically no agricultural statistics), the per capita production of wheat declined systematically in the post-war period--from 181 kilograms in the early 1950's to 141 kilograms in 1969/1970.<sup>8</sup> Even official estimates of wheat production (2 million tons in 1953, 2.4 million tons in 1972) attest to its lagging behind population growth.<sup>9</sup> According to this data, growth was only 20

percent in the last 20 years, whereas population increased to a much greater degree, according to existing figures on the average annual pace of population growth.<sup>10</sup> There was a shortage of indigenous grain and the government imported more and more of it from abroad. However, it was not possible to obtain grain from abroad each year and there was a shortage of resources with which to purchase the grain each year.

The deterioration of conditions for the working masses in the village was aggravated by a more and more uneven distribution of agricultural products. The tax and conscription exploitation of peasants of the 1920's and the development of the private feudal structure was replaced in subsequent decades by trade-usury and rent exploitation.

As long ago as in the last century, when England and Czarist Russia encroached upon the international Afghan market, these powers tried to destroy the time-honored character of agriculture, sold their goods via local middlemen on credit, simultaneously advancing the procurement of export goods thereby. Later when the Afghan peasantry was included in trade relations to a significant degree commercial credit and advances became separate--advances became monetary in form and both forms of credit began to acquire a more usurious nature. Gradually other forms of village credit evolved, both related and not related to trade. Peasants were forced to utilize lending funds more and more, their debts increased and they became dependent on their creditors.

In addition to usury there was a growth in the rent exploitation of peasants. Landowners owned the most fertile soil in the country and instead of a land tax the other form of exploitation of peasants was the feudal land rent. In Afghanistan as in other eastern countries landowners did not work their own land, renting it instead to the peasants. As land became more scarce during recent decades rents continued to rise, reaching 50 percent and more of the harvest. Just like trade-usury exploitation rent exploitation resulted in a dependence of renters on landowners. The withdrawal of supplementary production from peasants by means of usury and by means of renting landowners' lands to landless peasants or to peasants with small amounts of land marked the transition from the state-feudal agrarian structure to a private feudal structure. This transition had a great effect on agriculture and on the country's economy in general.

After the ouster of foreign trade and lending capital from the country in the 1930's the usury and rental forms of peasant exploitation became more and more interrelated. Merchant users, striving to expand their operations in the sphere of circulation and to increase their income from rents, invested some of their income in agriculture. The land holdings of lenders also grew as land was expropriated from peasants for debts. In addition to this, the sphere of circulation with its high profits attracted large landowners, who used their income from rents to become richer. Because under the conditions of pre-revolutionary Afghanistan a great deal depended upon the prerogatives of those in power, officials were also frequently merchants and users and landowners. At the summit of the feudal ladder was the Nadir dynasty and the administrative group of the Afghanistan National Bank, which held supreme power, the main positions in the sphere of circulation and the largest landholdings in their hands.



The increasing exploitation of peasants increased the inequality in the distribution of agricultural products and of the entire national product of Afghanistan. There are no statistics on this distribution, but much indirect data points to it.<sup>12</sup> "The differences between the rich and the poor are being felt more acutely," wrote the semi-official newspaper ISLA. "Poverty is spreading quickly."<sup>13</sup> One of the financial and economic advisors working with the Afghan government in the early 1970's noted, "The distribution of income became more unequal. The standard of living and income of the lowest groups was falling. The rich became richer and the poor poorer."<sup>14</sup> The situation did not change even after the overthrow of the monarchy in 1973. "Daud's regime," said the chairman of the revolutionary soviet, Premier Minister of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, N. M. Taraki, "promised to improve living conditions for the people. However, in 5 years of his administration the people's status deteriorated even further. Under the conditions that developed a revolution had to occur."<sup>15</sup>

The impoverishment of the majority of the country's population was in contrast to the impetuous growth in the income of landowners and merchant-users.

In recent decades the basic means for accumulating capital has been foreign trade. Afghanistan produced only a small fraction of the industrial goods needed by the country and imported most of them. Import industrial production, having a handicraft or even a factory-plant counterpart within the country, was produced at such low production costs and was purchased on the world market at such low prices (in comparison with the prices on the Afghan market), that it provided great profits for trade capital. As for the extensive nomenclature of industrial goods not produced in the country, in most cases their cost could not be compared with analogous expenditures of labor within the country; their purchase and import into Afghanistan were determined by their consumer value or by the labor they saved, and this even gave local trade capital the opportunity to sell the goods within the country at prices that were much higher than world prices. As a result the profits from international trade were usually no lower than several groups of ten percent and frequently profits were over 50 and even 100 percent.

The exploitation through usury of small producers was related to the development of foreign, and in the post-war period, of national trade. Usury was practiced by merchants primarily; professional users did not exist in either urban or village areas.

Several banks existed in the country, but if we omit the state emissary bank, almost an appendage of the treasury, these banks were primarily foreign trade organizations that used their small deposits for trade and lending purposes. A significant portion of bank credit was given to the trade department of the same bank, and in cases where credit was given to "outside" trade capital, demand was so much greater than supply that interest rates were usuriously high. Usurious operations with trade capital brought in a great supplementary income to the latter.

How were the accumulations of the merchants, users and landowners utilized? Since the sphere of circulation grew rapidly in the post-war period a significant amount had to remain within this sphere to finance the expanding

volume of foreign and internal trade and credit. We have already mentioned the increasing investments in agriculture. Trade and lending capital subordinated agriculture to its will more and more, increasing its trade sector to 30-35 percent in the pre-revolutionary period, a significant figure for the conditions existing in Afghanistan. The greater demand for land and increased prices for land encouraged the rise in rents and this promised even greater future profits for large landowners.

Housing construction became an advantageous supplement to merchant-lending accumulations and land rents. There was an increased demand for well-built houses in cities, which was related to an increase in the strata of rich urbanites as well as to the appearance of more and more foreigners in the country. As early as the 1950's the Afghan nouveau riche began the widespread construction of private dwellings. Subsequently housing construction became more intensive as more office buildings, stores and municipal facilities were built. New well-manicured sectors spring up in cities to contrast sharply with workers' sections in the old parts of town which did not have even the most elementary comforts. Living in the new cities were the local rich people and the foreigners, and the offices of many prospering businessmen.

A large portion of trade and lending accumulations and of rent income was taken abroad, placed into foreign banks and invested in valuable stocks, treasures and immovable properties. It is for this reason that Afghan leading circles and the bosses of trade and lending capital strove, despite the apparent advantages of trade with the USSR, to direct most of their exports toward the world capitalist market.<sup>16</sup> Rules governing foreign trade and currency regulation were in effect in the country; the major portion of currency earnings had to be sold to the emissary bank and the remainder had to be used to import goods into the country. But it was not difficult to circumvent these rules with the arbitrariness of the administrative elite and the terrible corruption of the state apparatus.

Administrative circles strove to direct some of the private accumulations into the development of modern industry, primarily for military and political considerations. Private investors who invested in industrial enterprises received various privileges and bonuses. The government also tried to stimulate such investments by also using foreign capital for such enterprises. However, the results were less than modest; it was possible to create only a limited number of private enterprises of the light and food industries. The profits levels of such enterprises were very small in comparison with the profit levels in the sphere of circulation--frequently there were no profits at all and sometimes losses were incurred. This was explained first by difficulties in competing with similar imported goods. For this reason it was difficult to recruit private capital into industry and there were practically no businessmen in Afghanistan who would be investing only in industry. As a rule, the investors were the same merchants, lenders and landowners who invested only a small portion of their capital into industry while keeping the biggest portion in the sphere of circulation where they received most of their income.

The expansion of the state sector in the economy during the post-war period did not bring fundamental changes to the country's socio-economic structure. The

state sector came into being prior to the regime of M. Daud in 1953 in connection with hydropower construction in the Gil'mendskaya Valley. Some of the foreign trade roles of the Afghanistan National Bank were transferred to the state sector as well. During the years of the five-year plans the state sector received a significant portion of the resources that entered the country in the form of foreign financial and economic aid. Administrative circles approached the expansion of the state sector of the economy as a temporary measure called upon to accelerate the economic development of the country, to improve the internal political situation on this basis and to strengthen the position of the dynasty in charge. Even during the period when the state sector was receiving its greatest development it hardly reached the primary branch of the economy--agriculture.

Thus, the bourgeoisie, the class that is related to the capitalist exploitation of hired labor, hardly participated in large industry. In the cities there were trade enterprises using hired labor and even simple machines and mechanisms. But such shops were economically weak, their owners were largely exploited by trade and lending capital and they suffered from the competition of imported goods even more than factory and plant enterprises. As for the development of capitalism in the village, it developed there even more slowly than in the city, as in other Asian countries; the capitalist structure within agriculture was very small. We cannot but agree with A. Yu. Umnov, who writes, "The very weak national bourgeoisie, under conditions of feudal and pre-feudal supremacy, could not in any way compete with either feudal or trade and lending capital which received direct state support."<sup>17</sup>

Thus, the accumulations of merchants, lenders and landowners, obtained at the cost of violating reproduction in agriculture and by incurring great losses to the basic production force in the country, hardly found a use in production under the conditions that existed in Afghanistan prior to the revolution. Since a significant portion of trade, lending and rent income was invested in expanding the sphere of circulation and pre-capitalist landowning there was a further exploitation of peasants and a sharpening of the agricultural crisis. Great losses to the economy and to the country's future were also incurred by the extravagant use of the exploited classes and especially by the removal of capital abroad. Poor Afghanistan, seeking aid throughout the world, financed the development of capitalist countries with a significant portion of its national riches.

An examination of socio-economic processes resulted in the exacerbation of the internal political situation in the country.

During the post-war period this problem came into the open for the first time in the late 1940's to early 1950's and was reflected in the formation of an opposition group in parliament. It was composed of representatives of the progressive intelligentsia and demanded some internal changes. It criticized the presence of the American firm Morrison-Nadsen in Afghanistan and the low procurement prices for grain and forage for the army. On the initiative of the opposition in 1949 parliament made a decision to cancel the aforementioned procurement. The opposition also came out for the repeal of compulsory labor which placed the biggest burden on the shoulders of the peasants, criticized the

state apparatus for the embezzlement of public funds and usury and demanded the implementation of the parliament's constitutional rights with regard to state finances. A deterioration in the economic and exacerbation of the political situation in the country increased disharmony in leading circles and this resulted in a change of leadership in 1953, as mentioned above.

However, the measures taken by Daud were insufficient to avoid the socio-economic crisis, especially in agriculture. Disharmony and struggles within the leading circles continued, which resulted in the overthrow of Daud in 1963.

In 1964 a new constitution was passed in an attempt to dissipate the tense internal political situation; it declared several democratic changes in the political structure. However, the 1964 constitution retained the foundation of the previous state and political structure, power remained in the hands of the Nadir dynasty and most of the places in the 1965 newly-elected parliament were occupied by the same feudal landowners, merchant-usurers and Islamic clergy. Attempts by representatives of the progressive intelligentsia to make use of their new rights were met with severe repression. The state hindered the formation and legal activities of political parties; periodic publications by the opposition during the second half of the 1960's were closed rapidly. The complexity of the internal political situation was reflected after 1963 in the frequent overthrows of royal houses.

However, neither the changes in internal and foreign policies implemented in 1953-1963 by the government of M. Daud, the constitution of 1964, nor the repression of the opposition in recent years could hold back the exacerbation of the class struggle in the country. Deep socio-economic processes lay at its foundation and they continued to develop. "The supremacy of feudal and prefeudal relations," wrote Babrak Karmal, "in combination with harsh social repression objectively led toward the aggravation of class distinctions. Poverty existence and the exploitation of workers by feudal landowners and khans resulted in protests by large masses of people."<sup>18</sup>

The opposition moved toward active non-parliamentary forms of struggle. In January 1965 there was a regular meeting of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, headed by N. M. Taraki and B. Karmal; in April 1966 the party's program, based on ideas of scientific socialism, was published.<sup>19</sup> The late 1960's marked a new stage in oppositionism, and now not only the representatives of the intelligentsia and students, but workers also participated. The government was particularly alarmed that oppositionist sentiments penetrated into the armed forces. The exacerbation of the internal political situation resulted in a greater struggle within leading circles. In July 1973 there was a military overthrow in Afghanistan, replacing Shah Zakhir with M. Daud, who proclaimed the country a republic.

The measures taken by M. Daud after 1973 to save the socio-economic structure existing in the country included efforts directed at providing for a dependable army. Soon after the overthrow army officers and sergeants were given benefits according to their rank and term of service.<sup>20</sup> In late 1973 a large group of generals and senior officers was retired from the army, to be replaced by young officers on whose loyalty the government counted. From the point of view of the



new regime the purging of the army of undependable people had to continue, but with time the officer ranks became filled with reactionary and even monarchically-inclined elements. As a result of the growth of ferment in the army due to the deterioration of the economic and internal political situations in the country, in early 1977 a new resolution was introduced concerning punishment, threatening severe punishment for oppositional political activity in the army.

In order to weaken pressure from below M. Daud intensified his reliance on demagoguery. The proclamation of a republic was itself a demagogic act because M. Daud concentrated such power in his hands that it could be equalled only by other monarchies. The new constitution of 1977 introduced the one-party system and gave the president complete power. The coming to power of M. Daud was accompanied by criticism of the problems of the past, of the extremely difficult economic situation, of peasant poverty, and of corruption in the state apparatus. In his first public appearance on the day of the overthrow on 17 July 1973 M. Daud said, "Antiquated relations in agriculture and very primitive methods of management which unfortunately reign supreme in our country resulted in the impoverishment of the peasants, in a curtailment of the national market, in a drop in the purchasing capability of the population and in a shortage of agricultural products."<sup>21</sup> Later M. Daud went even further in his radical phraseology and even proclaimed his belief in socialism.<sup>22</sup>

After 1973 M. Daud tried to eliminate problem areas and to secure a more rapid pace of economic growth in his economic measures. He again turned to developed countries and international organizations for extensive financial and economic aid, and after receiving promises of such aid he set up an ambitious 7-year plan for the economic and social development of Afghanistan, which was begun in 1976. The plan called for capital investments of 170 billion afghans as compared with 74 billion in the first four five-year plans; it was planned to develop many structures in various branches of the economy, including the construction of the first railroad in the country and of facilities for heavy industry.<sup>23</sup> A special role in the realization of the plan was to be played by the state sector, which was expanded significantly (nationalization of banks, the strengthening of the role of the state sector in industry, trade, etc.).

The program of the new government also declared the implementation of land reform. However, the elaboration of reform laws lagged. They were published only in the summer of 1975 and should have been put into effect in 1976. The feudal landowners were able to transform "agrarian reform" essentially into fiction. The laws called for maximal land ownership of 20 irrigated or 40 dry-farming hectares, for the removal of "surpluses" to sell to peasants without land or with small amounts of land. This type of reform, even if it had taken place, would have affected only a small number of landowners. In addition it would have been easy to circumvent the law by signing the land over to other family members and proxies. The Afghan press reported on the endowment of some peasants with virgin lands, but there were no reports on withdrawals of land from landowners on the basis of the new law. No attempt was even made to implement this land reform law.

Reality had little to do with the government's declarations not only in the sphere of land reform. Soon after the coming to power of M. Daud, the

progressive elements that prepared and realized the overthrow of 1973 were removed from power and Daud joined forces with rightist, reactionary and pro-monarchist forces. The dissatisfaction with the new regime became more and more widespread. A number of anti-government plots were uncovered in Kabul. In December 1976 there were reports of the arrest of over 50 high civilian and military individuals charged with anti-government activities. In February 1978 a trial was organized against these individuals, who, it was said, had been planning a coup. M. Daud removed the military minister and ordered the arrest of 200 officers and 500 civilians. The leaders and activists of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan was subject to more prosecution and repression. On 25 April N. M. Taraki, B. Karmal' and several other leaders of the People's Democratic Party were arrested. Under these conditions the leaders of the party turned to their supporters in the Afghan army with a call to an armed appearance. On 27 April 1978 an anti-feudal revolution took place in Afghanistan, overthrowing the regime of M. Daud and opening up the road for the national democratic development of the country.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. P. Franck. "Afghanistan between East and West." Washington, 1960, p 14.
2. Concerning the recruitment of Pakistan into the military-strategic and political plans of the USA, see: Yu. V. Gankovskiy, L. R. Gordon-Polonskaya. "History of Pakistan," Moscow, 1961, pp 254-259.
3. ISLAKH, 16 Nov 55, 21 Nov 55.
4. "Afghanistan in the 1970's," New York, 1974, p 100.
5. See: INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES, 1978, No 2, pp 199-200.
6. M. Fry. "The Afghan Economy," Leiden, p 40.
7. See: "The State of Food and Agriculture," Rome, 1969-1977.
8. Yu. M. Golovin. "Afghanistan," Moscow, 1962, p. 53; Sh. Zaripov, "The Production Forces in Agriculture in Modern Afghanistan," Dushanbe, 1972, p 104.
9. M. Fry. Op. cit., p. 11.
10. Most data points to 2 percent and more per year.
11. See: N. M. Gurevich. "The Economic Development of Afghanistan (Monetary and Credit Problems)," Moscow, 1972.
12. Prior to the revolution there were no statistics on agriculture or on macroeconomics.
13. ISLAKH, 9 Oct 46.

14. M. Fry. Op. cit., p 48.
15. PRAVDA, 17 May 78.
16. See: Yu. Bulakh. "Soviet-Afghan Foreign Trade at the New Stage," VNESHNYAYA TORGOVLYA, 1979, No 6, p 17.
17. A. Yu. Ummov. "The Afghan People on the Right Path," MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA, 1979, No 4, p 27.
18. PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALISMA, 1981, No 6, p 28.
19. KHAL'K, 11 April 66.
20. DZHUMKHURIYAT, 5 Aug 73.
21. KABUL TIMES, 18 Aug 73.
22. See, for example: ZA RUBEZHOM, 1976, No 30.
23. The basis for the financing of the 7-year plan should have been aid from Iran totalling 2 billion dollars, which was promised by the Shah of Iran and the purpose of which was to weaken Soviet-Afghan relations. However, almost none of the promised aid reached Afghanistan.

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## PRC POWER STRUGGLES PARALLEL THOSE OF IMPERIAL CHINA

Moscow NARODY AZII i AFRIKI in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 82 pp 73-81

[Article by S. N. Goncharov, graduate student at the Leningrad State University imeni A. A. Zhdanov: "Group Infighting Among Officials in China (12th Century)"]

[Text] In early 1981 the journal HONGQI carried an article by Yang Xianzhen, rector of the CPC Central Committee Party School and member of the CPC Central Committee who was repressed in the mid-sixties. It exposes the intrigues of Kang Sheng that led to the disruption of the party school. However, the article is not interesting only by virtue of the facts of the expose. Its chief idea is an attempt to prove that Kang Sheng was "the black quintessence of those who absolutely willfully twirled the helm of power, created the reasons for calamities and troubles [smuty], shook the altar of sacrifices to the ancestors and exterminated the dedicated and the good: his intentions and actions were repellent and he remained a perfidious villain to the end of his days." Kang Sheng's political methods, Yang believes, were akin to the machinations of well-known "base dignitaries" like Li Linfu of Tang times, Wang Zheng, Yan Su and Wei Zhongxian of Ming times, and so forth. But if Kang Sheng is viewed in the article as a counterpart of the medieval "influential eunuchs," "base dignitaries" or favorites, Mao Zedong is tacitly assigned the role of "emperor." It seems curious that Yang Xianzhen finds it most acceptable to interpret events of the political struggle via the traditional model of the "emperor-influential dignitary" relationship.

Apart from the clear desire to lend a publicistic edge to the charges against Kang Sheng, Yang Xianzhen's article probably also reflects the fact that the present-day internal political struggle among the elite of the PRC leadership in many respects resembles the struggle among Chinese officials in the Middle Ages. A number of other illustrations could be cited to show how events in the internal political struggle in the PRC nowadays are interpreted via medieval models and images.

The main reason for the preservation of certain traditional methods in the internal political struggle in the PRC has been the fact that real power in the country has been held by the special social stratum of "cadre personnel" (Hanbu), who are socially exclusive and privileged. The internal structure of the Hanbu is determined by the division into "ranks" and "categories" and their

life and activity are fixed by a code of written and unwritten rules and procedures. Many essential features link the hanbu to the traditional Chinese bureaucracy. It is the political existence of this social stratum that produces the similar features in the political culture of the hanbu and of the officials of imperial China.

Soviet sinologists distinguish two systems of political traditions in present-day Chinese political culture--"The traditions of the Chinese ruling classes adopted by Maoism and the traditions of the people's masses, above all the peasantry." Among the elements of the imperial Chinese political culture inherited by Maoism they rank the "Methods and ways of political struggle greatly influenced by 'palace politics,' that is, plots, intrigues, provocations and so forth, which constitute their own group (system) of political traditions and determine Maoism's own political culture." These theses have been specifically revealed in analyses showing the traditional features in the methods of internal political struggle in the PRC.

In this connection it is interesting to examine the methods of internal political struggle of Chinese officials in the Middle Ages. This account attempts to elucidate this question in the case of the rivalry between the "War and peace groupings" (1127-1142) in the era of the Song dynasty (960-1279). The main features of medieval Chinese officialdom had been largely formed at this period. Since in describing methods of internal political struggle we are dealing with something that is hard to define and sometimes elusive, I would like first of all to look at certain formal conditions and factors within the context of which this struggle proceeded.

#### The Struggle Among Official Groupings and the Government's Control Organs

The control organs that had long existed in the Chinese state apparatus were in theory supposed to ensure effective leadership of the officials and to guarantee the imperial power against encroachments by the bureaucracy. Their most important function was to ensure efficient activity by the state machine. We will examine the structure of the central government control organs of the Song era by following the progress of an official document--from the moment it was presented by the first minister to the emperor for consideration until it was handed over to the executive organ.

The emperor would sanction the implementation of a particular measure by placing his "resolution" [Chinese characters in parentheses in the text at this point] on the memorandum [Chinese characters] submitted by the ministers. The "Notes" of the Song author Wang Zeng report that during the Tang dynasty (618-987) the first minister would often submit to the emperor a "finished document" [Chinese characters] that he would ratify with his seal and pass on for execution. In the period we are considering, when, Wang believes, the imperial power had increased and the power of the first ministers had lessened, the emperor would first be presented with a "memorandum" and would place his resolution on it. Then the ministers would prepare a detailed document on the implementation of what had been proposed and would again present it for the emperor's approval to ensure that no violations of his will could take place. All the indications are that at the beginning of the rule of the



southern Song dynasty (1127-1279) the procedure was less complex: a memorandum that had obtained a positive resolution from the emperor would be passed down through the hierarchy [po instant'siyam] but proposals that the emperor had not approved would be delayed.

Before reaching the executive organ--the state council [Chinese characters]--a document had to pass through two control bodies: the secretariat [Chinese characters] and the chancellery [Chinese characters]. Then, at the stage of its transmission to the executive organ, it could be subjected to the criticism of the censors [Chinese characters]. The officials of the whole country would learn of the adoption of an official decision from the government newspaper "Capital Bulletin" [Chinese characters]. Let us examine in succession all the stages in a document's progress.

In the secretariat officials under the leadership of the chief secretaries [Chinese characters] had to draw up on the basis of the memorandum and the emperor's resolution a "preliminary decision on a less important question" [Chinese characters] or a "preliminary decision on an important question" [Chinese characters]. However, if they disagreed the chief secretaries had the right to refuse to draw up the decision [Chinese characters] and could send it back [Chinese characters] with an explanatory note.

If the secretariat did nevertheless draw up a "preliminary decision," it would be sent down to the chancellery, where one of the main duties of the officials under the leadership of the political advisers [Chinese characters] was to return in printed form and criticize [Chinese characters] the decisions on the less important and important questions, and also decisions based on the emperor's verbal orders [Chinese characters].

Sometimes after a political adviser had criticized a document and had not let it through, it would be returned to the secretariat, and chief secretary, bypassing the chancellery and supplanting its functions, would "investigate" the document he himself had written and would "pass it on for execution" [Chinese characters] to the state council. This would cause sharp criticism. In general, any attempts by the higher authorities to "bypass" any of the control bodies caused strong resentment among the officials. They saw this as a desire on the part of the first minister who was in power and his people to seize absolute power. However, if he observed all the rules of paperwork a minister could expect his decisions to pass unhindered through all the control organs only if he had "his own people" in them.

The struggle for posts in these organs can be illustrated in the case of the clash between ministers Qin Gui and Qu Yihao in 1131-1132. In an endeavor to strengthen his position, Qin Gui promoted Chang Yu and Hu Anguo to the posts of chief secretaries. These people prevented the appointment of officials promoted by Lu Yihao and defended those whom Lu Yihao ordered to be dismissed. The dignitary Xi Li advised Lu Yihao to accuse Qin Gui of creating a "grouping," noting the need to remove Hu Anguo first of all as the member of the Qin Gui grouping in a key post. Lu Yihao, following this advice, promoted to a post close to the emperor Zhu Shengfei, who had performed great services for emperor Gaozong during the military putsch by Miao Fu and Liu Zhenyan (1138) and so

enjoyed the ruler's favor. As Lu expected, Hu Anguo began to protest this appointment. However, the emperor nevertheless sanctioned Zhu's appointment; Lu Yihao, aware that Hu Anguo would not allow the document on Zhu Shenoffi's appointment to progress, ordered his protegee Huang Buinian, a junior official in the secretariat in theory subordinate to Hu Anguo, to write the "preliminary decision." Hu Anguo immediately accused Lu Yihao of violating the rules of paperwork and again began to object to Zhu Zhengfei's appointment. Having received permission to resign, the attempts by Qin Gui and other members of his grouping to keep Hu in his post were unsuccessful. Xi Yi's calculation proved to be correct: the resignation of chief secretary Hu Anguo was the prologue to the fall of first minister Qin Gui and the other members of his grouping. This generally pretty typical example shows how important it was for a particular grouping to hold the key posts in the secretariat and the chancellery.

Once a decision was sent down for execution, the censors had the opportunity to criticize it. In theory the censors' office was supposed to be an instrument of control over officialdom in the hands of the imperial authority. However, the real content of its activity, as in the case of the secretariat and the chancellery, depended on its specific composition of officials.

A tendency to debar first ministers from taking part in the nomination of censors can be seen in the legislative practice of the time. When vacancies appeared in the censors' office, candidates to fill them were nominated by the bureau of academicians [Chinese characters], the chief censor [Chinese characters] and the chief secretaries or political advisers. The emperor would personally choose people for the censors' office from these candidates. However, in practice, thanks to various machinations, the censors were ultimately often the ministers' creatures. They naturally did not criticize their patrons but, on the contrary, as obedient tools in their hands, "exposed" those whom their patrons disliked. Settled terminology even emerged to describe ministers' covert instructions to the censors--to "dump" this or that person: these were called "hints" [Chinese characters]. Another ploy that was widely practiced was for ministers to promote to the censors' office people who were "mild, fainthearted and lacking in ability" and only nominally held the post. It was in this way that Wang Tao became chief censor in 1128.

One of the first minister's main tasks was to secure decisive influence in the censors' office in order to make himself safe from criticism and to eliminate his political opponents via the censors. A stubborn struggle for influence in the censors' office typified the period of Wang Anshi's reforms. The defeat of Qin Gui in 1131-1132 was to a considerable extent predetermined by the fact that his opponents held the majority of posts in the censors' office; when he came to power a second time Qin had learned his lesson from this and **ensured** that by 1141 all posts in the censors' office were held by his nominees, which was one of the most important factors behind his victory over his political opponents.

From the example of the role of the control organs in the internal political struggle we can see that, as a rule, ministers were able to get particular



decisions implemented only by having their people in these organs--that is, in practice, by nullifying the functions proper to these organs.

What also follows from the aforementioned facts is the more general conclusion that the very essence and internal structure of the imperial Chinese bureaucracy, the structure designed to ensure infinite power for the emperor, generated groupings [Chinese characters] within the bureaucracy, which were seen by contemporaries as a natural phenomenon. The official Wu Shen, for instance, noted in 1134 that groupings had always existed ever since extreme antiquity and that they were a natural result of human nature.

So far I have discussed the political struggle within the framework of the regular control organs and rules of paperwork. However, sometimes a grouping that had gained power would try to break out of that framework and to smash it. In that case the ministers usually created a special department of "their own" that was not subordinated to the existing government structure and had the right to pass decisions without going through that structure. The head of the "department" was usually the minister himself and he would personally staff it with devoted people. The creation of these departments "not subordinate to the three ministries" and headed and staffed by the ministers themselves pursued their own personal objectives--to get political measures implemented, to "dump" opponents, and so forth. So a minister's opponents would primarily oppose his "department" and his supporters, in turn, would stubbornly defend these organs.

There was yet another method of implementing your decisions without going through the control organs. This was as follows. Winning the emperor's confidence, a dignitary could get him to "send down" a personally written or attested [Chinese characters] decision on a question interesting his favorite. Under Emperor Huizong (he ruled in 1120-1125) these "Notes in the Emperor's own Hand" [Chinese characters] bore an inscription in the top right hand corner: "Anyone who impedes the passage of this document will be condemned under the article on 'great disrespect' and exiled a distance of 3,000 li." Understandably, these "Notes" were usually not delayed or criticized by the control organs. Under Huizong up to several dozen such "Notes" were issued each day and the "three ministries merely drew up the documents." This helped to strengthen the influence of the emperor's favorites, who would "arrange" good appointments by means of these "Notes" in exchange for bribes.

As already noted, once an order was passed on to the executive organ the officials of the whole country were notified of it via the "Capital Bulletin"--a kind of strictly official newspaper that underwent obligatory government censorship. But in addition to this semiofficial organ [ofitsioz] that reflected the course of the grouping in power, there were also the so-called "Little bulletins" [Chinese characters], which were compiled by the same officials, but this time bypassing the authorities, and which contained information that might not suit the ministers in power and could "sow disinformation and lies." G.Ya. Smolin points out, quite rightly, that the "official press-little bulletins" opposition reflected the clashes of groupings at the top.

And the desire of those in power to ban the "little bulletins" reflects [tense as published] a wish to establish a monopoly of the mass news media. The conflicting groupings also sought to influence public opinion by putting up inscriptions defaming their opponents and their measures on busy streets in the capital.

#### Ministers' 'Cadre Policy' and the Internal Structure of the Groupings

The fact that in the Middle Ages politicians sought to rely on their relatives and on people from the same region and that these people formed the nucleus of their groupings is pretty self-evident and does not need to be specifically established. I would like here to draw attention to certain other criteria whereby ministers sought to recruit supporters for themselves.

Ministers who were implementing sharp changes in policy sought to offer protection to officials who were not of ancient family and did not have influential connections among the bureaucracy. Zeng Bu, who owed his career to Wang Anshi and "unquestioningly obeyed" him, can serve as an example. The desire to promote "petty individuals" personally devoted to him was also characteristic of Qin Gui. People he had "promoted" were afraid of violating their patron's wishes in any way, but Qin dismissed them from their posts whenever he chose. This policy, incidentally, enabled Qin to replace 34 "assistant ministers" during his 18 years in the post of first minister.

As the struggle between groupings became fiercer the need arose for the officials who had gained the upper hand to formally consolidate the results of their victory. To this end in 1036, at the insistence of first minister Lu Yijian, a list of supporters of the defeated reformer Fan Zhongyan were put up in the palace for all to see. After this the winning groupings usually drew up lists of the members of the overthrown enemy grouping and displayed these for people to see. By means of these "lists" the labels of "reformers," "conservatives," "traitors" and so forth were clapped on entire groups of officials. For the ministers arriving in power these labels were reference points, so to speak, for the selection of cadres and the labeling was a powerful instrument of political struggle. For instance, the 1104 list officially called the "List of Opponents of the Reformers" actually included everyone who did not suit the first minister of the time, Cai Jing, including outstanding reformers.

The ministers promoted some officials and repressed others--this was their only opportunity to create reliable support for themselves. Thus Li Gang, who had risen in the service thanks to the patronage of Cai Jing, leader of the "New Laws" grouping, repressed supporters of the "Old Laws," many of whom had to serve in the puppet state of Chu against their will.

Conversely, Fan Zongyin, who had been sullied by service of the "False Chu," on becoming first minister began to carry out measures to rehabilitate officials expelled from their posts for service in the puppet state and to carry out a purge among officials who had received "unfair advancement" during the period of the dominance of the "New Laws" grouping.

After the resignation of a first minister his opponents usually secured the resignation of all the people he had promoted and also those who could be ranked on formal grounds as members of their groupings--people from the same region, for instance. In such a situation the label of member of a particular grouping could be clapped on any official who had successfully advanced in the service during the period of the dominance of the overthrown minister.

Under conditions of the protracted dominance of a particular grouping practically any official could remain in the service and make a career merely by expressing devotion to the particular grouping and adjusting to its course. Indeed, the main channel for entry into the ranks of the officials was to pass the "degree examinations," but the groupings arriving in power sometimes changed the structure and topics of the examinations to suit their own aims. Moreover, the most reliable method of achieving success in the "court examination" was to include flattery for the first minister in your answer. The answers, of course, had to be couched in the spirit of the demands imposed by the supreme authorities of the time.

Having expressed approval of the course currently being pursued, passed the degree examination and entered the ranks of the officials, such a person had to seek opportunities for advancement. One of the main methods of advancement was the "guarantee recommendation" [Chinese characters] whereby a higher official would recommend a subordinate for promotion and assume responsibility for his protege's zeal. When a grouping was dominant for a long time practically any official who had served during that period could be accused of obtaining a recommendation from any of the senior officials of that grouping and be labeled appropriately.

Under the conditions of the periodic changes of political course and changes of leadership particular types of behavior and thinking took shape among the officials. Following the political situation, some officials readily "exposed" those whose patronage they had sought only yesterday or, as the current saying had it, "Mocked the man with whom they had just bathed because he was naked." Some of them, shamming submissiveness and approval, sabotaged government measures that ran counter to their views.

To what extent were the members of the groupings (say "reformers" and "opponents of reforms") guided in their struggle by considerations of principle and did they all struggle against their rivals because of ideological disagreements?

It has been suggested that under the Song dynasty, as a result of the smooth functioning of the "post entrance examinations" system, which always produced a great number of people who had passed the examinations and had the right to fill posts in time began to exceed the number of vacancies available. The pressure of these "surplus, unemployed officials" lent a fierce character to the struggle between groupings.

It can be said with sufficient confidence that the struggle between groupings in itself constantly created a situation in which some officials were squeezed out of top posts in the leadership. This could happen not only after

the victory of one grouping over another, but also during a change of emperors. In such a situation what became most important for ordinary members of a grouping was not their disagreements of principle with their opponents, which the leaders maybe did have, but the desire to retain their posts. At the end of the northern Song era, for instance, groupings appeared that were called not after the political course they pursued (supporters of the "new" or the "old" laws) but by the names of their leaders (the Cai, Wang, Li groupings). Authors of the time noted that these groupings, paying no attention to state affairs, were concerned only with getting their members into high posts. In all probability this stemmed from the fact that concealed desires--which had existed even before--of the ordinary majority of members of the groupings came to the surface under the conditions of the clear devaluation of the ideological values of the preceding period, even at the top. So far as they were concerned, clearly, the main point of the struggle was a successful career and devotion to the grouping boiled down to an orientation toward a particular leader.

The desire to strengthen their own position sometimes meant that ordinary officials submitted suggestions that repressions against overthrown opponents be toughened up and extended as much as possible. This, first, created some kind of guarantees against their return to power and, second (which is equally important), was a most reliable method of securing the favor of the authorities.

So far I have mostly discussed the relations between groupings. Let us now consider the links within the groupings. The ordinary members of a grouping headed by a particular politician were usually called his "clients" [Chinese characters]. By the time of the Song era the term [Chinese characters] meaning "domestic teacher" or "person under the protection of a rich patron" had become widespread.

In political life at the period people who owed their promotion to a particular figure and enjoyed his special trust were called "clients." Here is a phrase from a source that is characteristic in this respect: "...When Qin Huizhi was in power, Zheng Xiang, one of his relatives, was his 'client.' He was on particularly close and confidential terms with him." To be the "client" of a particular politician often meant to share his fate.

Two types of "clients" can clearly be distinguished. The first is people promoted to high posts by a patron and carrying out his will in the government. Zhang Jun, a "client" of Huang Qianshan nominated to the post of censor by him, can be ranked as such a person, for instance.

But probably of greater interest are the "clients" who held insignificant posts (or did not hold posts at all), performed delicate missions for their patrons and were their closest advisers. For instance, the Song author Zhou Mi reports that Qin Gui would choose such "advisers" from capable young people who had failed the examinations. Interestingly, the patrons themselves preferred not to mention these "covert clients" directly, using even in their memoirs phrases like "one of my clients told me..." These "covert clients" performed the patrons' most delicate missions. Thus, for instance, Li Gang sent his "client" Hu Cheng to persuade the dignitary Lu Haowen to assist Li Gang in compiling



a list of "traitors" who had served the "false Chu." Later, when Li Gang had been dismissed, Hu Cheng "drafted" a message from higher school student Chen Dong asking that Li Gang be left in his post. Clearly, these "clients" mobilized public opinion in the interests of their patrons by spreading rumors.

The above observations on methods of internal political struggle must be regarded as merely a first attempt to analyze the problem. However, I think that a comprehensive study of the methods of internal political struggle used by Chinese officials at various periods of the Middle Ages and a comparison of these with current events will make it possible to see more clearly what really remains of the past in the PRC political culture. The study of the continuity and evolution of traditions will help elucidate the essence of what is going on in the country at the present time and may make it possible to forecast the course of certain processes.

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## DYNAMICS OF THE SOCIAL-CLASS STRUCTURE OF TURKEY

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[Article by G. I. Starchenkov: "Dynamics of Social Class Structure in Turkey"]

[Text] Turkey, like the other countries of the east, is usually included in the group of multi-structured nations. Modern and traditional structures exist and interact here. According to the most important indicators--the proportion of capital investments, the scale of technology utilized, production effectiveness, the volume of production output, etc.--the leading positions are occupied by two modern structures--the state capitalist and the private capitalist structures. At the same time natural-patriarchal, small goods and other market structures of a traditional nature have the advantage in the number of enterprises and the number of workers.<sup>1</sup> With such a relationship between modern and traditional structures it would be more correct to consider Turkey as a capitalist rather than a multi-structured country. Moreover, we can establish that it is approaching the middle level of capitalist development, which is squeezing out precapitalist structures as well as cooperating with them.

Of all eastern countries, state capitalism appeared first in Turkey. Initially the policies of "statism" were directed at managing social and economic development and at strengthening private enterprise in the country. State capitalism reached its apogee in the 1930's when the state, utilizing planning elements, realized the building of industrial and infrastructural objects on a larger scale than ever before. During the post-war period there was an almost equal development of state and private capitalistic structures, whereas during the mid-1970's the latter did not occupy a leading position in the national economy any longer.

Extensive private enterprise began to grow noticeably during the period of the Second World War, when it broadly utilized the specifics of foreign economic competition. The stimulus for the development of the modern private capitalistic structure was provided first by foreign aid in accordance with the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan and then through contracts with the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European Economic Community and other mutual contracts.<sup>2</sup> In the opinion of some Turkish researchers, the "planning" years (the first five-year plan began in 1963) were the "golden age" for large private enterprise in Turkey.<sup>3</sup>

The rapid development of capitalism both "horizontally" and "vertically" provided the foundation for the destruction of the management structure of development and probably for the transformation of the entire socio-economic model of the country. In this sense an important function was played by the transformation of agriculture, which to a significant degree supplies modern industry with raw materials, a voluminous sales market and an as yet inexhaustible labor force.

After the Second World War the Turkish government took important measures to introduce and spread capitalist production methods in agriculture (here a special role was played by the Land Reform Law of 1945, the effect of which was felt into the 1970's). Incentives were provided for the transition of large and average landowners to capitalist enterprise (loan credits, increased procurement prices for animal and vegetable products, decreased sales prices for imported agricultural technology, etc.). As a result a significant portion of the large and average landowners accepted the capitalist method of management and some of the average and even small enterprises participated in it to a certain degree.

In the village capitalism received a solid material and technical base. Whereas in 1948 1,800 tractors worked on Turkish fields to cultivate 9 percent of the total area, in 1977 325,200 tractors cultivated almost three-fourths of the area. The number of tractor plows increased during this period from 1,500 to 332,600; of mowers and reapers--from 14,700 to 32,000. There was a noticeable increase in the use of chemical fertilizers--in 1950 55,000 tons were applied (fewer than 5 kilograms per hectare) whereas in 1973 almost 6 million tons (about 360 kilograms per hectare) were applied.<sup>4</sup>

By the 1980's the modern private capitalistic structure became supreme for a large portion of agricultural lands. At the same time small-goods and even natural-patriarchal structures continue to hold their positions on significant territories.<sup>5</sup>

The distribution of capitalistic management methods in the social plan meant that in Turkey there were practically no landowners left as a class of feudal society. A large number of them were transformed into agricultural entrepreneurs, i.e. capitalists. On their farms they utilize agricultural machinery and instruments widely, use hired labor and actively participate in the transactions of the internal and sometimes the foreign market. Many agricultural entrepreneurs invest their accumulated capital not only in their own farms but also in industrial and commercial enterprises in the city.

The process of breaking down the Turkish peasantry is continuing. The more prosperous but relatively small group became agricultural entrepreneurs. On their fields technology is utilized, hired labor and "family workers" are employed and the landowners themselves work. These Turkish farmers from below, together with large and average entrepreneurs (past landowners) form the village bourgeoisie. According to our data the number of rural operators (including a small number of operators of the feudal type) comprised 200,000-250,000 individuals in 1975 (about 2 percent of the economically active population).<sup>6</sup>

A significant number of "independent peasants" formed average enterprises which operate within the framework of private capitalist, small capitalist and small trade structures. These average peasants have been using more agricultural technology in recent years (sometimes bought or borrowed collectively) and they or members of their family work the farms. As a rule they hire outside help for only a short period during planting or harvesting campaigns. When receiving state credit or in internal markets they constantly come into contact with the competition of more prosperous entrepreneurs.

The most important metamorphosis is occurring with the poorest part of the peasantry, which is serving as the material for the formation of the working class and for a number of social classes. The poor suffered most of all from the development of capitalism--land entrepreneurs, by concentrating production, chased off renters and bought up neighboring plots of land (especially from peasant debtors). The use of highly productive technology in the fields denied thousands of paupers land and work. The agrarian overpopulation was made more difficult by a demographic factor--in poor families with many children only the oldest son could count on inheriting land since the further division of land was purposeless. Crushed by need, the poor took the first job available, becoming (sometimes temporarily) agricultural workers, farm laborers and "family workers." Many move to the cities and merge with the semi-proletarian and proletarian populations. Despite the great social mobility of the poor their proportion among the employed in the village increased from 17 percent in 1950 to 25 percent in 1975. This can be explained not only by the active processes of population growth but also by the fact that their ranks are increased from those of impoverished average peasants.

As capitalist enterprise developed in Turkish agriculture there was an increased demand for a hired work force capable in particular of operating tractors, mowers, sprayers, etc. A specific characteristic of eastern countries is that here both open and closed ("semi-feudal") hiring are employed. This is attested to in particular by the existence of an extremely large social category called "family workers." It is correct to suppose that most "family workers" are close and distant relatives of the head of the household who together with the family members participate in household and field tasks. At the same time among them are people who have no family ties to the farm owner but who were hired to work in return for lodging, food, clothing and as such they have become quasi-family members. These people are subject to merciless exploitation (in addition to being in a situation in which they have no rights), which enables the owner to produce a supplementary product, including that which is used for capitalistic accumulation. In other words, in a number of cases we have capitalistic exploitation without the capitalist form of hiring.<sup>7</sup> For this reason the distribution of traditional hiring forms<sup>8</sup> (and reimbursement for labor) is not only an indicator of the lack of maturity of capitalism but is also a sign of its development.

In the post-war period there was a noticeable increase in the number of workers for whom open, or purely capitalistic, forms of hiring and reimbursement for labor were characteristic; this increase can be attributed to the entry into the ranks of ruined peasants. In 1950 of the 9 million people working in agriculture wages were received by 240,000 persons, or 2.6 percent of those working in this branch, whereas in 1975 out of 10.5 million 490,000 persons or 5.7

5.7 percent worked for wages.<sup>9</sup> Nevertheless these figures do not give us an idea about the total proletarian population in the village since in Turkey as in other eastern countries agricultural workers receive natural and mixed wage payments. In addition, Turkish statistical data does not consider those agricultural workers who change their permanent residence at least once in 3 years and keeps track unsatisfactorily of seasonal workers for whom capitalistic hiring has become the chief source of livelihood. For this reason the population of the rural proletariat should be considered to have been 400,000 in 1950 and 800,000 in 1975.<sup>10</sup> This population's growth is kept back noticeably by the diversion of agricultural workers into large industrial and administrative centers in the country.

The migration of villagers to the cities resulted in a rapid growth of the urban population. In 1950 Turkey's population was 20.9 million people, of whom 3.8 million, or 18.5 percent, lived in the cities. In 1975 the population reached 40.2 million of whom 17.1 million (42.6 percent) were concentrated in the cities.<sup>11</sup> In 1982 when the population exceeds 47 million the country will achieve an important socio-demographic indicator--half of the population will consist of city residents.

The rapid process of urbanization in Turkey (the annual urban population growth is up to 6 percent, of the population as a whole--about 2.6 percent) as in other eastern countries differs noticeably from a similar process that takes place in the countries of Europe and North America--it is not based on the needs of industrialization and the entire course of economic development of the city. For this reason under conditions of expanded population growth in the city not all migrants were able to obtain jobs. Many of them remained without permanent work and resources, forming a new poverty class in the city.

For a long time the growth in "blue collar" workers was secured through former village workers who had resettled in the city. Only an insignificant portion of migrants became real industrial workers, whereas a large portion is entering the sphere of services and light industry. The migrants must adapt to city life as well as to stressful regulated labor, which they had never faced before. They must spend even more time erasing their petty bourgeois peasant psychology and their proprietary illusions.

A small number of persons entering the working class are ruined artisans, handicraftsmen and small merchants. Their complete ruin is usually preceded by a bitter competitive struggle to retain the status of "small entrepreneur," which they value highly. When the struggle is finally over and they have lost they become workers but retain the goal of improving their circumstances in order to return to their "true calling."

The ranks of the working class are also filled by technical personnel of the lower and middle links, whose numbers are constantly growing, especially in large plants and factories. Technological labor is no longer "the work of the select,"; it has more in common now with the work of trained workers. For this reason some technical specialists, because of the existing objective production conditions, are considered "white collar workers." There is also a growth in the population of the working class as more children are born into families that belong to that class.



Officially light industry in Turkey includes those enterprises which employ no more than 10 persons and which operate using no greater than a 50 horsepower engine. In the processing industry in which most such enterprises are concentrated there were 79,200 of them (97.7 percent of the total number in the given branch) in 1950 and 170,600 (97 percent) in 1970. The enterprises operate primarily within the framework of small capitalistic and small trade structures with mixed forms of hiring the work force. The number of workers in small industry has increased consistently, but their proportion for the aforementioned period dropped from 50.6 to 42.2 percent. In 1970 only 30.3 percent or 98,300 workers worked for wages.<sup>12</sup> The remainder of the hired workers should evidently be categorized as temporary workers, "family workers," and apprentices who formed seasonal transitional groups.

Large enterprises of the processing industry, which hardly changed in number, were able to increase the proportion of production supplied by them--in 1945, 67.2 percent, in 1963-75 percent and in 1970 83.7 percent.<sup>13</sup> In this branch there was a convergence of the work of trained workers and technical personnel and today the category of industrial worker encompasses the majority of technicians, laboratory workers, draftsmen and other technical personnel. The small number of technicians and engineers who are involved in production operations rather than in administration and whose contributions are not much greater than those of trained cadres form transitional groups (we must note that most engineers are in the middle and intermediate strata).

In 1950 the population of the entire Turkish proletariat was 1.4 million (12.7 percent of the working population); in 1975--3.8 million (20.4 percent). In a quarter of a century the ranks of the working class almost tripled. Thus the Turkish proletariat became one of the largest classes in the country.

The development of a Turkish bourgeoisie followed a difficult path, which even today is reflected in its heterogeneity. Historically, the main role here was played by large merchants and lenders who gradually directed their accumulated capital into entrepreneurial activity. A small group from the middle strata also became involved in private enterprise, which enabled it to move up to a higher rung on the social ladder. However, with the appearance of the state-capitalistic structure the sources for the formation of a bourgeoisie changed noticeably. The creation and development of a state sector was accompanied by a rapid growth in the Turkish bureaucracy. Most of the higher bureaucrats fulfilled administrative and control functions and some turned to entrepreneurial activity. The provision of incentive credits, the issuance of large contracts, the distribution of foreign aid and much else depended to a great degree on the laws and instructions prepared by government workers. The powerful bureaucratic apparatus turned into an independent force, the activities of which are related to making important administrative decisions in practically all areas of the economy and politics.

Bureaucrats do not hire workers but they participate indirectly in the exploitation of hired workers. Also characteristic of the Turkish bureaucracy is the embezzlement of state resources, corruption, the receiving of "commissions," etc. Important representatives of the bureaucracy are recruited more and more frequently as stockholders in private firms. Thus, these workers



form a large bureaucratic detachment in the bourgeoisie either through their practical activities in the state apparatus or through the nature in which they make use of their income. It should be noted that it is characteristic for Turkey to recruit into business the highest ranking officers--retired generals, etc.

In the post-war period the bourgeois class increased notably in number. In 1950 it was comprised of about 400,000 persons (3.6 percent of the economically active population) (including a small number of landowners); in 1975--over 900,000 (4.9 percent).

The petty bourgeoisie is the largest class in Turkey. It includes a number of social groups that together are called the "middle" or "intermediate" strata because they occupy a "middle" position between the working class and the bourgeoisie. This class is composed primarily of small entrepreneurs, peasants, traders, artisans, employees, officials, etc.

Artisans and handicraftsmen find themselves in a very difficult position (especially in the village). The operation of the artisan's shop, where all of the family members work (including "family workers") as well as up to five hired workers, is closely tied to market competition. For the small weaver, spinner, tanner, woodcutter or metal cutter production credits, securing a regular supply of raw materials and goods and dependable profits for selling the final product have always presented difficulty. With the development of mass production and the import of inexpensive foreign goods these difficulties proved insurmountable for many thousands of artisans and handicraftsmen.

Until the Second World War the income level for artisans was higher than the wages for workers, but now they are noticeably lower. But artisans grasp at their status as small entrepreneurs, move quickly to new forms of production for which there is a demand (most of the demand for inexpensive and low quality products in the cities comes from migrants from the village). Nevertheless more and more artisans and handicraftsmen are ruined and must hire themselves out as workers; others become paupers and bums.

The largest and a growing strata of the intermediate level is the minor employee. His number has grown from 300,000 in 1950 to 700,000 in 1975.<sup>14</sup>

The approximate number of persons comprising the intermediate levels was 5 million (45.5 percent of the working population) in 1950 and 6.4 million (34.4 percent) in 1975. There was a noticeable decrease in the numbers comprising the small and middle peasantry and artisans and handicraftsmen, but the number of minor employees, teachers, doctors and lawyers has grown. The proportion of middle levels has decreased appreciably.

The lowest (marginal) levels of the Turkish city and village are represented by declassé elements of various social groups. On the basis of a number of characteristics the lowest levels should be divided into two large social categories--traditional (paupers and bums) and modern-transitional (former residents of the village who are striving to improve their status in the city usually through new forms of activity). Let us examine the development of the

second category, since it is the primary material in the process of forming new classes and social levels.

The new residents of the Turkish city are usually former peasants, ruined artisans and handicraftsmen, agricultural workers and family workers. Because of the deformity of the economy, of the discreteness of interbranch development and the lack of correspondence between city and village forms of labor most of the migrants are not absorbed by industry and other branches of the city economy. As a result their transitional period is lengthened and their declassé status is extended indeterminately.

The instability of the economic situation forces migrants to maintain close ties with the village, to support contact with family and friends. Some of them (5-10 percent) cannot deal with "city life" and return to the village. The rest keep hoping for a job and for an improvement in their standard of living. Becoming part of a new social category means first getting a permanent job, which is very difficult to do because the demand for untrained workers is low. With the passage of time most migrants to the city find jobs as workers and employees as well as as temporary workers, apprentices, "family workers," and so forth. Not a small number of migrants left without a job become paupers and bums.

The Turkish marginals are characterized not only by their lengthy status as "semi-employed," but also by their special form of settling. New residents are concentrated in enclaves called "gedzhekendu" (dwellings put up overnight) in which over one-fourth of all city residents live. In these dwellings, unsanctioned by the authorities and devoid of urban amenities (it is difficult to bring roads, electricity, water lines and sewage lines to them), the life style reflects the customs and traditions of the village. Under such conditions the process of adaptation to the urban way of life proceeds very slowly, as do the assimilation of new socio-cultural values and of new forms of social and demographic behavior. According to our figures the number of modern marginal individuals comprised 0.4 million in 1950 and 1.4 million in 1975. Despite the fact that some of the migrants enter other social classes and levels, they are replaced with new peasants from the village.

Thus, in Turkey the process of class formation is taking place quite actively. This is evident from the data in the table.

The Number of Classes and Social Levels in Turkey				
	1950		1975	
	Millions of persons	%	Millions of persons	%
Working class	1.4	12.7	3.8	20.4
Bourgeoisie (plus landowners)	0.4	3.6	0.9	4.9
Middle levels	5.0	45.5	6.4	34.4
Lower levels	4.2	38.2	7.5	40.3
Total	11.0	100.0	18.6	100.0

Source: G. I. Starchenkov. "Labor Resources of Turkey," Moscow, 1981, p. 180

The data in the table shows the rapid growth of two modern class antagonists--the working class and the bourgeoisie, the proportion of which in the total economically-active population increased from 16.3 to 25.3 percent in the last 25 years.

Destitute peasants, the unemployed or partially employed of cities and villages, paupers and bums, forming the lowest level, are increasing absolutely and relatively. The incapability to halt the impoverishment of the working masses, the growth in their declassé nature are primarily the results of capitalist development and of the social policies of the country's administrative circles.

The impoverishment of the lower and parts of the middle levels is resulting in greater numbers among the proletariat with greater mutual interests. The representatives of these levels are becoming objective political allies of the working class. In Turkey in the process of class formation there is a development of social forces that is nearing completion that under specific historical conditions will decide the question of the future socio-economic development of the country, of which path Turkey will follow.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. See, for example: P. P. Moiseyev. "The Agrarian Structure of Modern Turkey," Moscow, 1970; Yu. N. Rozaliyev. "The Basic Characteristics of Capitalist Development in Turkey," Moscow, 1962; "Turkish Republic" (Guide), Moscow, 1978.
2. We share the point of view of G. K. Shirokov that "foreign aid became one of the most important instruments for accelerating capitalist development in developing countries" (See G. K. Shirokov, "Intra-Strata Interaction in the Developing Countries of the East," NARODY AZII I AFRIKI, 1979, No 4, p 113.
3. D. Avdzyoglu. "The Structure of Turkey. Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow," 1978, Istanbul, p 783.
4. Turkish Annual 1968, Ankara, 1968, p 183; Economic Report 1971, Ankara, 1971, p 106; Economic Report 1979, Ankara, 1979, pp 135, 137-139.
5. P. P. Moiseyev, in describing agriculture during the mid-1960's, noted that "almost half of the landowners' lands (3.5 million of 7.7 million) were occupied by the capitalist sector, about one fourth are using various transitional forms and the remainder of the lands (i.e. no more than 2 million hectares) are usuriously rented to peasants with no land or small amounts of land." (P. P. Moiseyev, aforementioned work, p 88).
6. We feel that there is a problem with the 1975 census registering only 8,100 agricultural employers (less than 0.1 percent of those working in agriculture). Evidently most kulaks were classified as "self-employed," comprising 2,946,500 (28.1 percent). See: General population survey, 26 Oct 75, Ankara, 1976, p 36.

7. The given situation does not exclude the fact that in eastern countries there is frequently "exploitation on the part of capital without the capitalistic means of production" (See: V. V. Krylov. "On the Socio-Economic Nature of Hired Labor in the Cities of Afro-Asian Countries--Middle (Urban) Levels in the Developing Countries of Asia and Africa," Moscow, 1972, p 38.
8. In the country as a whole the number of "family workers" increased from 6.7 million in 1955 to 7.4 million in 1975, but their proportion in the employed population dropped from 54.6 to 45.2 percent. Moreover, over 80 percent of the workers were occupied in agriculture (T. Yazgan. "The Demographic and Socio-Economic Structure of the Turkish Work Force in the Process of Urbanization," Istanbul, 1968, p.129; Almanac Turkey 1977, Ankara, 1977, p 154.
9. Calculated according to: Les problemes du travail en Turquie [Work Problems in Turkey], Istanbul, 1961, p 6; Economic Report 1977, pp 68, 75, 130.
10. Soviet researchers usually quote higher figures (over 1 million agricultural workers in the 1970's). It is difficult to agree with this if we consider the distribution of hiring in non-capitalist production or the savings of a hired worker of income from precapitalist forms of labor.
11. Economic Report 1976, Ankara, pp 53, 55.
12. Pocket Statistical Annual on Turkey 1974, Ankara, 1975, p 116; Annual Summaries of Surveys of Processing Industry for 1973 (Preliminary Report), Ankara, 1974, p 1, 19; Statistical Yearbook, 1968, New York, p 222; Almanac Turkey 1977, p 204.
13. Kh. Dzhillov. "The Turkish Economy," Moscow, 1971, p 171; Almanac Turkey 1977, pp 77, 204.
14. T. Yazgan. Op. cit., p 129; TIC, 9 June 1975; Almanac Turkey 1977, p 154.

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INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON "OIL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC DIFFERENTIATION IN THE ARAB EAST"

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 82 pp 144-149

[Article by S. L. Maksimov: "International Symposium on 'Oil and Socio-Economic Differentiation in the Arab East'"]

[Text] The economic and socio-political differentiation of the Arab world began to increase sharply in the mid-1970's. Fuel-energy and other structural crises in the world capitalist economy affected the approach to and results of decisions regarding key developmental problems in Arab countries under conditions of raw materials and agro-raw materials specialization and resulted in serious changes in social and socio-political life as well as in the foreign policies of the region's countries.

Having given rise to so many problems, the differentiation phenomenon aroused (it could not but have aroused) the lively interest of a wide circle of eastern scholars, noted Ye. A. Lebedev, chief of the Arab department of the IV [Institute of Eastern Studies] of the USSR Academy of Sciences [AS USSR], in his opening speech at the international symposium of scientists from the USSR and the GDR [German Democratic Republic] in November 1981 in Moscow. Its participants were Soviet Arabists from a number of scientific, educational and practical organizations and scholars from the GDR, headed by G. Bartel, director of the economists in the Division of History and Economics in Near Eastern Countries of the University of Leipzig.

We are speaking first on elaborating an approach to evaluating the nature and scale of this multifaceted phenomenon, the inequality in the development of and the disparity in the positions of individual Arab countries. In the opinion of S. L. Stoklitskiy (USSR), speaking on the topic, "The Effect of the Oil Factor on the Differentiation in Socio-Economic Development of Arab Countries," a single multi-measure indicator synthesizing the various aspects of economic, social and political reality and capable of serving as a dependable measure of inter-country stratification probably does not exist. A picture of differentiation in the Arab world can be obtained by examining interrelated characteristics of resources-economic potential,<sup>1</sup> the place of the region's countries in the world capitalist economy, the level of development of their production forces and their social and political orientation.



Of keen interest to the audience was the speech of M. S. Modelevskiy (USSR), who characterized the prospects for development of oil production in the region. In his opinion in the mid-1980's the industrial use of liquid fuel oil will increase although at a slower pace than previously. More and more measures are being taken to conserve energy sources, including the decreasing of oil consumption in production. Based on the fact that at the present time oil from Arabian countries meets 30 percent of the demand for liquid fuel in the world and considering that by the year 2000 the total demand for Arab oil will comprise about 23 billion tons in the coming two decades as a whole, the speaker posed the problem of whether the Arab world will be capable of satisfying this possible demand. Answering in the positive he at the same time turned the attention of the audience to the inequalities in the distribution of oil reserves in the Arab world and to the differences in the roles that will be played by Arab oil exporters in supplying the world with oil. According to the proposed hierarchy the most advantageous position is occupied by Saudi Arabia as well as Kuwait, Iraq and the United Arab Emirates (OAE). Probably in the course of continued oil production the gap between the "leading four" and the rest of the oil-producing countries in the region will increase. At the same time he pointed to the prospects of developing oil production in the Sudan, Somalia, Morocco, YAR [Yemen Arab Republic] and NDRY [National Democratic Republic of Yemen], where extremely favorable prerequisites have been noted for organizing oil production on a considerable scale.

The availability and exploitation of liquid fuel significantly alters the strategy of economic development of leading Arab oil exporters. In his speech, "Income From Oil and the Production Process in the Arab World," I. P. Ivanov (USSR) uses the examples of Algeria, Libya, Iraq and Saudi Arabia to examine the complex influence of the oil factor on the process of public production. The mass utilization of income from oil resulted in the acceleration of the growth pace of the gross national product and in increased industrialization based, as a rule, on the building of capital intensive structures. At the same time, as the experience of development shows, the smaller proportion of branches in the processing industry within the structure of industrial production in Libya, Iraq and Saudi Arabia (in comparison with Algeria) is a serious hindrance to accelerating the pace of production of the total national product.

The important moment in the change of production structure of the gross national product was noticeable, and in some cases there was an unprecedented rapid rise in the norm of accumulation (in Algeria up to 47 percent of the Gross National Product in 1978). It was accompanied by an increase in the proportion of machines, machine tools and equipment in the technological structure of the GNP. However, the noted precipitous changes in industrial production still do not indicate a transition to an intensive stage of development. The author feels that the backbone for production development is, as before, made up of extensive growth factors, including above all an increase in employment.

The influence of the oil factor spreads far beyond purely economic processes to the entire socio-economic structure of Arab society. As a result the differences in the public-political evolution of countries having a large oil-production base become particularly noticeable. In connection with this the speeches of many

of the symposium's participants were concentrated on analyzing the nature and contradictions in the persistent capitalist transformation of society in Arab countries. R. N. Andreyan and V. V. Ozoling (both--USSR) in their joint report, "Oil Monarchies of the Arab Peninsula--Specific Characteristics of Socio-Economic Development," feel that the transition of these countries from feudalism to capitalism is a phenomenon without historical analogy from the point of view of qualitative features as well as of dynamics and bourgeoisification. Whereas in Europe the bourgeoisie overthrew the superstructure and rebuilt the base according to its image and concept, on the Arab peninsula the very representatives of the feudal structure are being transformed into the bourgeoisie and attract the non-high born trade and banking bourgeoisie into joint business, although they do not allow the latter any real political power. The authors propose that the elite stratum that is thus formed be called a petrocracy.

The state feudal-monopolistic capitalism of the Arab monarchy acquires its own features (according to the terminology of the speakers). It developed not as a result of normal processes of capital concentration and production centralization; instead it was created by a feudal-monarchic regime, thereby turning around the entire scheme of orderly passage from one step to the next in the classical variant of capitalist development of the Old World.

Many theses presented by the author's report are confirmed by an analysis of specific situations in individual countries of the Arabian peninsula. In an interesting report, "The Effect of Petrodollars on the Process of Forming Capitalistic Production Relations in the United Arab Emirates," G. Bartel' (GDR) showed with specific materials that a significant portion of the country's personified wealth is not in the hands of the developing national middle class, but in the hands of the feudal administrative leadership. Supported by state and legal regulations which guarantee it a supreme position, this leadership is assimilating the fruit of the oil boom. With this background we can see the genesis of a traditional middle class related to trade, the sphere of services and the financial sector of the country. As noted in the report, the rapid transformation of the capitalist traditional structure is being hindered because many of its elements and representatives have remained true to their inclination to invest capital into the non-productive sphere that provides a rapid and high return. This can explain the growing interest in the organization of all types of small production enterprises.

An essential feature of the immaturity of capitalism in the United Arab Emirates is its dependent nature. Despite the presence of a number of fairly large enterprises of heavy industry the main impulses for the development of a modern capitalistic sector come not from the national economy but from centers of world capitalism.

Among the specifics of capitalist modernization of society we should include the fact that the predominant portion of the hired work force, especially in the sphere of industry, is recruited from among foreigners. In discussing this subject, Ye. S. Melkumyan (USSR) noted that in Arab countries the law strictly regulates not only economic but political and social activities of the foreign work force as well. The isolation and social disorientation of immigrants is encouraged by the fact that their wages are much higher here than at home.

As concerns the local work force, it was the unanimous opinion of all speakers that local political circles strive to build an impenetrable wall between indigenous and foreign workers, utilizing some of the oil income to "fatten up" their "worker aristocracy," to develop in it a feeling of wealth, social and moral superiority and striving thereby to protect themselves from social change.

The persistent transformation of feudal monarchy, the meeting of the old and the new, the layering of ultra-modern capitalist enclaves over the patriarchal social strata all encourage the strengthening of contradictions. As I. L. Piotrovskaya (USSR) proposes, the accelerated modernization of these countries, the growth in their participation in various aspects of world capitalism results in an "erosion" of traditional institutions as well as in their distinctive renaissance. The cultivation by the leadership of Islamic and family-tribal relationships has the purpose of easing traditional elements into the 20th century and of guaranteeing the regime a peaceful formation of a new model for social development.

The possible consequences of the uncontrolled development and "westernization" of eastern society were discussed by G. G. Ebert (GDR) in, "The Role of Oil and Petrodollars in the Creation and Formation of the Islamic Republic of Iran." In analyzing the socio-economic lessons of the anti-shah revolution the author notes that petrodollars not only did not have a stabilizing effect on the regime but actually served as a type of dynamite for a socio-political explosion. Only a few privileged strata of the population were able to utilize income from oil. This in connection with the pro-west orientation of the shah's regime did not stabilize Iranian society and also strengthened social contradictions between the various detachments of the shah's opposition and the regime itself.

In considering the experience of Iranian events Arab monarchies are doing everything possible to prohibit the penetration of "seditious" ideas into a society based on a foundation of orthodox Islam. Nevertheless, feel R. N. Andreasyan and V. V. Ozoling, the contradictions between the rapid transformations induced by capitalism and the archaic superstructure, between modernization and feudal obscurantism are so acute that in the final analysis they cannot but find their resolution, even partially, on the basis of the Arab monarchy in some way or another.

The effect of the oil factor is different in countries where progressive socio-economic transformations are being introduced and where a course has been undertaken to rebuild society in the interest of broad masses of people. It is characteristic that large oil exporters of the region such as Algeria, Iraq, Libya are among the countries that in their time were first to begin the fight against foreign capital and to establish effective sovereignty over their oil wealth. In turn income from oil became an important material factor which to a considerable degree eased the tortuous breaking of an antiquated society and the establishment of new, progressive social structures.

As noted by A.G. Virabov (USSR) in his speech, the Algerian government for a long time preferred to solve economic problems by means of forced capital-intensive industrialization, utilizing the latest achievements of science and technology, thereby achieving considerable results. Within the framework of the state

sector the fundamental branches of heavy industry were developed and new industrial regions appeared on the Algerian map. At the same time we must note that the push toward industrial development under conditions of general economic backwardness resulted in a certain lag in the area of the social needs of the masses and in a weakening of attention to the needs of agriculture. The alignment for leading models of science and technology under conditions in which the social orientation of the state continues to lie within the system of the world capitalist economy resulted partially in a contradictory increased dependence of the country on western markets, capital and technology. Clearly aware of arising difficulties and remaining true to the progressive anti-imperialist course, the Algerian government is making the necessary changes in its policies. We are speaking in particular about increasing attention to agricultural development, energetic attempts to solve the foodstuffs problem and the great efforts directed at improving the material level and social conditions in the lives of all Algerians.

The contradictory effects of the oil factor on the development of Iraq were discussed jointly by S. N. Alitovskiy, G. S. Shakhbazyan and A. F. Fedchenko (all--USSR). The nationalization of the oil industry and the country's struggle within the framework of OPEC for the satisfaction of justified needs in developing countries--oil exporters resulted in an abrupt expansion of possibilities of development on a progressive basis. Materially and financially the position of the state sector in key branches of the economy was strengthened. It became possible to direct significant resources to improve social services to the population, to develop systems for health care, education and so forth. At the same time we cannot ignore the fact that under the conditions of a lack of homogeneity in the social and political structure of Iraqi society the greatly increased income from oil exports has created a material base for developing a middle class.

Very different is the effect of the oil factor on the development of Libya. In a joint report, M. Yu. Roshchin, S. Kh. Kyamilev, and G. I. Smirnova (all--USSR) noted that Libyan policies are directed at the intensive utilization of oil income primarily for the purpose of forcing economic and social development. The most important result of the transformation that have taken place in the country was the strengthening of the position of the public sector in the national economy and the improvement in the well-being of the indigenous population. At the same time the rapid rise in income in a society with an extremely low, backward level of social development and with clearly expressed anti-imperialist sentiments on the part of the leadership have resulted in the development of a unique political system, a so-called, "dzhamakhiriya." In the opinion of the authors, this system has not yet acquired clear and persistent features and thus it is too early to make a final judgement on its effectiveness.

The oil factor has its "secondary" and multifaceted effect on many countries in the region which at the present time do not find it possible to produce and export large quantities of liquid fuel. This theme was the subject of Ye. K. Golubovskaya's (USSR) report, which was devoted to the experience of the Arab Republic of Yemen. On the one hand the mass influx of petrodollars into the country via workers-emigrants and international aid mainly from the Arabian peninsula encourages the strengthening of the international economic position of the young state and the development of the material sphere of production.



Dynamic migration forms a wealth and social differentiation of Arab society, erodes its tribal structure and creates favorable conditions for the development of a national culture. On the other hand, we must consider some negative phenomena. The mass outflow of the persons most capable of working has resulted in a shortage of workers within the country. This was accompanied by a sharp drop in the volume of agricultural production, which together with an increase in the number of people with purchasing power (due to the influx of petrodollars) has made the foodstuffs problem more serious. As noted by Ye. K. Golubovskaya, in addition a significant portion of the income imported into the Arab Republic of Yemen together with the higher consumer standards of the Arab monarchies is utilized for consumer needs rather than for production uses.

The inequalities of social and economic development in oil importing and oil exporting countries have left their imprint on the course of processes of regional integration. They have stimulated the processes of migration of the labor force. This problem was the subject of a report by A. N. Kamenskiy (USSR).

Questions of forming regional financial centers were examined by L. I. Lushnikova (USSR). With the availability of large financial surpluses in the form of petrodollars it became possible and necessary to export capital. Since the mid-1970's there has been an increasing tendency to form a regional market for capital and Arabian regional financial centers on the basis of utilizing petrodollars. In this the speaker sees a striving by Arab exporters of capital to retain their resources in the region and to keep their use under their unlimited control. The implementation of this policy is hindered primarily by the immaturity of the market of loan capital. The energetic creation of new large credit-banking institutions in the region and the growth in the volume of financial operations, primarily in Kuwait and the Bahrain, provides us with a basis to suppose that in the coming 10-15 years the Arabian market of petrodollars will become a fairly independent institution functioning in an analogous manner to the market of Asian dollars.

Within the international political plan the availability of mass surplus petrodollars allows many conservative Arabian regimes to utilize them as a means of pressure on neighboring Arab states. In analyzing the activities of Arab developmental funds financed by conservative feudal monarchies M. Foygt (GDR) emphasized that these funds serve as a cover for putting pressure on the policies of recipient countries. In the opinion of L. V. Val'kova (USSR) the main goal of the leadership of Saudi Arabia is to strengthen rightist forces and to stimulate various types of reactionary and conservative elements in the countries receiving Saudi aid.

Changes in the economic and to a degree in the political weight of the leading oil-producing countries of the region is forcing the powers of neocolonialism to change their strategy and tactics to a certain degree. K. G. Susanyan (USSR) characterized the activities of American monopolies in the zone of the Persian Gulf. While retaining the primary motives of corporate activities (securing access to sources of energy and raw materials and extracting large profits through monopolies) American capital has new tasks, such as expansion under conditions of growing competition with European and Japanese monopolies. In the opinion of A. M. Vasil'yev (USSR) the vital interests of the Western



European "ten" in the Near and Middle East do not coincide and actually contradict the course Washington has undertaken, the actions of which serve only American monopolies which strive to utilize the varied processes of socio-economic differentiation in Arab countries for their own gains.

The processes of differentiation in the Arab region are unusually varied. G. K. Shirokov, deputy director of the Institute of Eastern Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences, emphasized in the concluding speech that the socio-economic and political consequences of this are complex and contradictory.

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## TWO-VOLUME 'ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASIA' TO BE PUBLISHED

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 82 pp 149-150

[Article by L. B. Alayev, V. L. Reznikov: "New Publication--'Encyclopedia of Asia']

[Text] Izdatel'stvo Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, together with the Institute of Eastern Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences, has planned to publish a two-volume "Encyclopedia of Asia" in the course of 1986-1990. The Institute of Eastern Studies has created a scientific subdivision as an independent sector to prepare the word list, to organize a review of the word list and of articles and to organize scientific editing. The work schedule has been determined.

Our goal is that the publication, which we hope will become a landmark in the history of eastern sciences at home, will attract the attention of the Soviet and world scientific community, will reflect the most important accomplishments of our science and will generalize our accumulated knowledge. The "Encyclopedia of Asia" will have a humanities direction, i.e. it will deal with problems within a complex of sciences which all comprise "Eastern studies." Thus it will be possible to closely examine questions of history, modern political problems, economics, culture (including traditions and religion), literature, languages of Asian peoples, the history of Eastern studies and the history of the peoples of the East and Russia and the USSR. Materials on geography, geology and biology must be reduced to the size necessary for more fully illuminating the problems of economy, demography and the ecological balance.

Articles on history, geography, literature and language will be written with a consideration of the fact that branch encyclopedias on these subjects have either been published or will soon be published. An effort should be made to cut down on repetitiveness of material in encyclopedias. In the area of linguistics, for example, we can limit ourselves to discussing the problems of linguogeography, sociolinguistics and the genetic ties among languages. In the area of literature there should be a treatment of the uniqueness of the genres of prose and poetry of Asian countries, of the social role of literature in the historical and cultural process. Historical material will be presented in the form of historical monographs, short informative articles devoted to the most important events, terminology and phenomena. Chronological tables will also be provided.

Material on the history of culture, philosophy, religion, customs, traditions and law must be presented as completely as possible. These aspects of social life are reflected in other encyclopedias to a comparatively lesser degree.

Geographically the publication will encompass Asia outside our borders, but here the historical and cultural ties of this region with other territories must be taken into account. For example, we cannot exclude North Africa when discussing leading eastern civilizations, as an element of the Hellenistic system of countries, a part of the caliphate and a part of the Ottoman empire. Also, questions related to the participation of north African countries in Near Eastern conflicts, in the activities of the Arab League, in OPEC, etc., must be illuminated on the pages of this publication. Asia will include countries located on two continents, such as Turkey and Egypt.

The question of Central Asian and Caucasian material will be dealt with in the same manner. The history and culture of modern foreign Asia cannot be presented without the countries whose centers were located in Central Asia, without mention of Central Asian and Caucasian poets and scholars of the middle ages. Without doubt Siberia, Central Asia and the Caucasus must be represented in history and culture that is of general importance.

Asia includes many developing countries, and for this reason the encyclopedia must devote some space to an examination of theoretical problems of the national freedom movement, i.e. problems that surpass the limits of Asia itself. The typology of developing countries, common traits of their development in the colonial period and at the present time, the special features of the development of capitalism on the periphery of the development of the middle class, the laws governing the processes of social orientation, the problems of structural changes in the East--all of these questions must be fully illuminated in the encyclopedia. The theoretical level of the publication must correspond to the modern status of Soviet Eastern studies.

Considering the modern tendencies in encyclopedic publications (increasing the number of articles while curtailing their length) and the necessity to include a large number of terms that are not defined in other encyclopedias, primarily short articles are planned for this publication. The average article will have 1,040 printing symbols.

An appendix will include a list of the largest cities of Asia (100,000 residents and up), a chronological synchronic table, national systems of weights and measures, calendars and holidays of the peoples of foreign Asia and some other information.

The word list being prepared at the present time will consist of two parts--a complete list of articles and a list of terms whose meaning will be found not in individual articles but from context. An index at the end of the second volume will aid the reader in finding the terms of the second order. This type of structure will render the publication more informative and useful for a broader range of readers.

Well-known Soviet Eastern scholars will act as members of the editorial board and as scientific consultants in various fields. The author's collective will include the scholarly forces of Moscow, Leningrad, Tashkent, Dushanbe, Tbilisi, Yerevan and a number of other scientific centers of the USSR. The material in the encyclopedia will be broadly edited. Under consideration is a proposal to include a number of important Eastern scholars from fraternal socialist countries in our work.

We are hoping for the most active participation in our new publication of all Eastern scholars in the scientific collectives of the country.

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CONFERENCE ON 'SOCIETY AND STATE' IN PREREVOLUTIONARY CHINA

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 82 pp 157-159

[Article by A. I. Kobzev, A. M. Model', V. S. Ivanov, I. M. Steblin-Kamenskiy, V. G. Shkoda, I. V. Alibekov, L. S. Frishman and M. Sadvokasova: "Chronicle of Events"]

[Text] Moscow

Institute of Eastern Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences

On 10-12 February of this year the 13th scientific conference on the subject "Society and State in China" took place, organized by the Division of China Studies. Participating in the conference were the representatives of about 30 scientific-research institutes, higher educational institutions and museums of the country presenting 96 reports and speeches devoted to various aspects of the history and culture of China from prerevolutionary times until the middle of the 20th century.<sup>1</sup>

Twenty two speeches were heard, many of which were accompanied by a lively discussion. The conference was opened by the chief of the China division, L. P. Delyusin, who noted that this time the conference was being characterized by a thematic unity, the direction being philosophical and cultural problematics. In particular, a great deal of attention was given to an analysis of methodology used by traditional Chinese philosophy and science. This was the subject of reports by A. M. Karapet'yants (ISAA [Institute of the Countries of Asia and Africa] of MGU [Moscow State University])--"'Wa gua' as a Classification Scheme," by A. I. Kobzev--"The Classification Scheme 'Five Elements' of the Xing" by Ye. V. Kukhtina (both from the Institute of Eastern Studies [IV] of the USSR Academy of Sciences)--"'Shan hai jing' : Some Problems in the Structure and Typology of the Text," by S. V. Zinin (ITMVT [Institute of Precision Mechanics and Computer Engineering] of the USSR Academy of Sciences)--"On the Problem of Constructing Hexograms of 'Yi Jing'," and by G. T. Alekseyev (Leningrad)--"Right-Left in Ancient Chinese Medicine." All of these reports

<sup>1</sup> See: "Thirteenth Scientific Conference, 'Society and State in China'," Editor-in-chief A. N. Khokhlov, editors N. M. Kalyuzhnaya, A. I. Kobzev, A. N. Khokhlov. Parts 1-3. Moscow, 1982.



examine spatial-numerical classification schemes which for Chinese scholars played a role of universal ordering structures similar to the structures of formal logic which served as a universal organ for European thinkers.

In his report V. V. Yevsyukov (IIF [Expansion unknown] of the Siberian Division of the USSR Academy of Sciences), "The Cosmology of the Chinese Neolith as a Reflection of the Dual Organization of a Patrimonial Society," presents some data on the social-anthropological roots of classification schemes. He presents the hypothesis that the traditional four-part division of space into horizontal planes is a reflection of the four-part division of the endogamous collective (two of its endogamous families are comprised of two agamous halves). V. V. Yevsyukov relates this topological structure to the system of "well fields" (jing tian), which in his opinion is the fruit of the theoretical imagination of Men-tszy. In his speech A. M. Karapet'yants tried to show that the system of eight trigrams of the "Yi jing" ("Book of Changes") represented a considerably powerful classification scheme related to the scheme of the five elements (Wu Xing) and was utilized as an interpretation of the objective world as well as for constructing its description. The speaker demonstrated the high degree of internal systematization in classical Chinese texts and he was asked whether this was purposeful on the part of the authors or whether this resulted objectively from the lengthy elaboration and "reshuffling" of the final number of symbols. A. M. Karapet'yants proposed that the canonical texts were created systematically on various levels. A. I. Kobzev discussed the specific problems of Chinese philosophy, which he views in the absence of three interrelated and fundamental philosophical phenomena--developed idealistic doctrines, formal logic, dialectics and as a result the absence of psychology, theology and the theory of the individual as a non-material essence. Dialectics and its opposite, formal logic, arise as a result of the construction of an ideal world of concepts since in the material world "contradictory" objects such as the circle square do not exist. In general Chinese philosophy considers finely "materialistic" that which European philosophy considered ideal; the speaker qualified this as naturalistic or realistic and constructed on a numerological (quasi-mathematical) and not on a logical methodology.

Of the deity in traditional Chinese ideology, Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism, Buddhism attracted the greatest attention. It was discussed by T. G. Komissarova (LO [Leningrad Division] of the IV USSR Academy of Sciences)--"Special Problems in the Classification of Buddhist Texts in the 'Collection of Notes on the Translations of Tripitaki'," by S. V. Volkov (IV USSR Academy of Sciences)--"Korean-Chinese Buddhist Ties and the Development of Buddhism in Korea (5th to 9th centuries)," by A. N. Ignatovich (MGU)--"On the History of the Spread of Buddhism in Japan in the 7th-early 8th Centuries," by S. P. Nesterkin (ION [Institute of Social Sciences] of the BF [Bashkir affiliate] of the Siberian Division of the USSR Academy of Sciences) --"On Two Aspects of the Function of the Word in Chan-Buddhism," by A. M. Kabanov (LO IV Academy of Sciences)--"Zen and Traditional Chinese Culture in Japan of the Middle Ages," by Ye. S. Safronov (AON [Academy of Social Sciences]--"On the Archaic Elements in Zen (chan) Buddhism." T. G. Komissarova countermanded the notion that Buddhism in China could not become the basis for official imperialist ideology or an independent religion. In the opinion of A. M. Kabanov it is a serious

error to equate Chinese chan buddhism and Japanese den-buddhism. The latter acted as a transmitter and synthesizer of Chinese culture in general and not specifically of chan.. In connection with this report T. P. Grigor'yeva (IV of the USSR Academy of Sciences) expressed the opinion that the detailed study of specific texts must be preceded by a comprehension of the "code" for a given culture. S. P. Nesterkin differentiated between two different understandings of the word in chan buddhism, as for example "dead" as one incapable of expressing the truth and "living" as one carrying within himself the highest truth. The first is the product of clouded and the second of illuminated consciousness. This type of ambivalent relationship to the word makes it necessary to make not only a philosophical and philological but also a psychological analysis of chan texts.

The theme of Confucianism was not left without attention at the conference. In the speech, "On the Nature of Ideology in the Epoch of the Fall of Ancient Society in China," T. V. Stepugina (IV USSR Academy of Sciences) evaluated the evolution of Confucianism from the second century B. C., when it was proclaimed the official ideology of the empire to the second century A. D. when ancient orthodox Confucianism was finally confirmed as a transformation of social-philosophical teaching into a religious-philosophical doctrine. She examined this process using materials from the "school of new texts" and the "school of old texts," reflected in the "Bo hu tun" (first century A.D.). A. S. Martynov (LO IV USSR Academy of Sciences) spoke about "Emperor Kansi and Confucius," giving a completely different interpretation of Confucianism. In his opinion the Confucian tradition in its official interpretation represented a very abstract theory separated from specific historical reality which because of this could be pragmatically utilized and had a low, non-sacral status. The interaction of Confucianism, official ideology and social and political practice in China of the Middle Ages was also discussed in the report, "Relations Between the Song and Jing Empires in 1125-1139 and the Nature of Chinese Concepts of 'Barbarians'" by S. N. Goncharov (LGU [Leningrad State University]). In analyzing the struggle between the two states he demonstrated how the Chinese side "adapted" contractual conditions it was subjected to into an intractable system of rituals based on the unshakable concept of state as the single intermediary between Heaven and people. S. N. Goncharov emphasized the presence of two hypostases in the being of the Chinese emperor--the sacral essence and the ruler of the kingdom, which was reflected in different terms--jing zi (son of Heaven) and wang (emperor) or huangdi (sovereign emperor) respectively. The problem of relating Confucianism not with an official ideology but with another philosophical tendency, Taoism, was raised by Yu. L. Krol (LO IV USSR Academy of Sciences) in his report, "On the Love of Sym Tsyun for the Unusual." Theoretically defining non-Confucian thought as Taoist, he pointed to its relationship to the author's creativity. The evaluation by Confucianists Yang Xiong and Wan Gu of the creativity of Sim Qian with the aid of the category "love of the unusual" was interpreted by the speaker as a feature of a world view and not of stylistics.

The report of Ye. A. Torchinov (State Museum of the History of Religion and Atheism), "On the Connection Between Taoist Teaching About Immortality and the Philosophy of Early Taoism" was devoted strictly to Taoism. The speaker strove to prove the philosophical unity of Taoism and so-called religious Taoism

which scholars usually view as principally different. He proposed a three-phase scheme of development of Taoism from its inception to the fourth century B. C. During the discussion of the speech criticism was directed at Ye. A. Torchinov's idea concerning the "commonness" of the transformation of a religion into a philosophy and not the reverse and concerning the fact that for Christianity as for Chinese religious teachings the declaration of an immortal soul is not an essential postulate.

An attempt to characterize the culture of imperial China in general was made by V. V. Malyavin (ISAA of MGU) in his speech, "The Non-Phenomenal Ritual and the 'Anguish of the Solitary Individual'." He characterized it as ritualized, paralogistic as expressed in morality, cosmology and administrative control, in the rationalization of the archaic mythological consciousness in which there is no discord between heaven and earth, God and man and because of this in which there is a great deal of stability. During the discussion of the given thesis the speaker was criticized--classification schemes cannot be taken from mythological thought since they are called upon to explain the world and mythological thought does not have an etiological function. Using the codices of the Tang dynasty, M. V. Vorob'yev (LO IV of the USSR Academy of Sciences) in his speech, "The Terms 'Good People' (langmin) and 'Evil People' (jianmin) in Chinese Law of the Middle Ages," reported that these terms, widely used in the Far East from antiquity and into the late middle ages, referred to the personally free and personally not free individuals, but that this was not in the strictly judicial sense. A. A. Bokshchanin (IV of the Academy of Sciences) in his speech, "On the Crown Domains and Estates of Sovereigns in the Early Ming Period," discussed an interesting episode in Chinese history when in addition to regular administrative divisions of land special estates were created, called by the names of ancient principalities and given to blood princes with the title of "wang" for management. The goal of Zhu Yuanzhang, the first emperor of the Ming dynasty and the one who established this system, was to strengthen his own power with the aid of double controls.

Following tradition, much of the conference was devoted to literary and artistic problematics. L. Z. Eydlin (IV of the Academy of Sciences) in his speech, "The Steps of Literary Heritage in China," analyzed six comic poems by Du Fu. He concluded that the smoothness and uninterrupted development are special features of Chinese literature and that the classical works are vital works and not just literary monuments. L. N. Men'shikov (LO IV of the Academy of Sciences) spoke about, "The Custom of the Wedding with the Colorful Tower," saying that this custom for the selection of a groom by a young girl, so extravagant for China, was not a literary fabrication by playwrights but a reality of the 13th century. The speech of L. I. Kuz'men'ko, (GMINV [State Museum of the Arts of the Eastern Peoples]), "Chinese Applied Arts in the Second Half of the 19th Century in the European and Russian Interior," examined the "eclectic forms of Chinese and Western applied arts. The problem of the assimilation by the Chinese of specifically western ideas was treated by A. A. Krushinskiy (IV of the Academy of Sciences) in his speech, "The Treatment of Liberalism in the Works of Yan Fu: the Semantics of the Term 'ziyou' as its Conceptual Basis." He discussed the difference between the term "freedom" and its Chinese equivalent, "ziyou" and described

the specifics of the liberalism of Yan Fu as analagous to maximal self-realization under the conditions of "war of all against all" ("war of things"). The reaction of V. S. Solov'yev, the great Russian religious philosopher, to Chinese culture was discussed by V. V. Serbinenko (MISI [Moscow Order of the Labor Red Banner Engineering-Construction Institute imeni V. V. Kuybyshev]) in his speech, "V.S. Solov'yev in China." Interesting parallels between the works of Chinese and European writers and artists J. Swift and Li Ruzheng, P. Picasso and Qi Waishi were drawn in the reports of O. L. Fishman (LO IV of the Academy of Sciences) and Ye. V. Zavadskaya (IV of the Academy of Sciences).

T. N. Akatova (IV of the Academy of Sciences) in her speech, "An Evaluation of the Negative Consequences of the Lilisan Phenomenon for the Ties Between the KPK [Communist Party of China] and the Working Masses," discussed the tragic significance of the ultra-leftist adventurist Lilisan course of the 1930, which cancelled the positive decisions of the 6th CCP Congress regarding moving closer to the working masses. G. D. Sukharchuk spoke about the modern status of Chinese economy as an element in the system of the world economy and Yu. M. Garushyants (both from the IV of the Academy of Sciences) analyzed the internal political situation in the People's Republic of China based on data from Chinese periodicals. L. P. Delyusin summarized the work of the conference.

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# BOOK ON PRC CAMPAIGN AGAINST CONFUCIUS, LIN BIAO DISCUSSED

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[Discussion by A. S. Martynov, A. A. Krushinskiy, V. A. Maslennikov, A. S. Mugruzin, L. P. Delyusin of the book: Perelomov, L. S. "Confucianism and Legalism in the Political History of China," Moscow, Nauka, 1981, 333 pages.: "Discussion"]

[Text] A. S. Martynov (Leningrad Division of the Institute of Eastern Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences. The book under discussion appears to me to be a unique phenomenon in native sinological literature. In this case the epithet is used not in a panegyric but in a thematic sense. For the first time a specialist who is a scholar of Chinese antiquity and who is knowledgeable about the modern history of China has given us an analysis of one of the most curious incidents in the history of Maoist China and of a unique phenomenon for modern times--the campaign "to criticize Lin Biao and Confucius" (1972-1976), an analysis that includes detailed research into two basic political doctrines of ancient China and the socio-political conditions for their development. L. S. Perelomov begins his book with a description of one of the most characteristic traits of the Chinese political culture, the institution "politics-history." The reader-non China specialist can readily note that this problem is inherent in any human culture to a degree. Existing policies seek expression in the present, in the not yet complete and thus not completely understood, and in the past. They want to express the unknown through the known, the impermanent and the unclear through the permanent and clear. This is why the past is sought and why history becomes a means of expression. This tendency is strengthened during stormy periods in man's history. We can remember the Biblical images in the period of the English revolution or the ancient images in the time of the French Revolution. The reader-China specialist can add that the institution "politics-history" is at least of the same age as Confucianism and maybe significantly older and that the last dynasty of imperial China, the Manchu, had a special passion for it. Despite all of this, after reading L. S. Perelomov's book the reader is left with the distinct impression that he has become acquainted with a phenomenon that is unique in its nature. Wherein lies this uniqueness? The author points to two essential features--the degree to which politics has been absorbed by history and the degree to which the masses of the people have been recruited into the campaign. And truly, it is hard to imagine that in any other country large masses of people will soon be recruited to discuss the



problems of their history to the degree that this occurred in China. Doesn't this speak of the exclusive force of tradition in the public consciousness of certain circles in modern China? We can add to this that the long history of China itself has not experienced such an assimilation of politics by history, such an ideological discussion of broad masses of people. A paradoxical situation results--using the language of the past an ideological battle with the past develops to such a peak of intensity that it forces us to doubt that the past actually existed; on the other hand the absence of analogs to this discussion in the long history of the Middle Kingdom brings us to the thought of a qualitatively new nature in the conflict, hidden behind the debunking of one doctrine of the deep past and the extolling of another. And the fact that these two sides are united in the campaign to "criticize Lin Biao and Confucius" is far from accidental; it is organic and natural. After reading L. S. Perelomov's book there can be no doubt of this. The author thoroughly and in detail traces the formation of the two ancient doctrines without limiting himself to the ideas that would be most harshly judged in the 1970's of the 20th century. It should be said that this section of the book contains one of the best descriptions of Legalism as well as Confucianism in our literature. The author was able to combine popularity and clarity, making these pages accessible to all those who are interested in the spiritual culture of China, with scholarliness and a specific analysis of material, which it seems to me will satisfy even specialists on Chinese antiquity. I would like to emphasize still another function of the first section of L. S. Perelomov's book. It enables the author not simply to declare but by comparing the entire system of ideas of Confucianism and legalism to demonstrate more convincingly that the basis for the campaign did not lie in the doctrinal conflict. The contradictions between Legalism and Confucianism were not as irreconcilable as ascribed to them. Moreover, these doctrines were capable of jointly diffusing and merging, which the author demonstrates in a special concluding chapter in the first section of his book (pages 205-220). We will not even mention the fact that after the Han synthesis the political history of China did not reflect any great conflicts between Legalism and Confucianism. However, it did reflect another conflict that passed through the entire history of imperial China, the conflict between the autocrat in the person of the emperor and the advocate of normative behavior in the person of the steadfast follower of Confucian teaching, the "perfect man" or "noble man" (junzi). The perfection of the political superstructure of the Chinese empire depended greatly on how regulated and dampened this conflict was. It should be said that most governments on the "Central Plain" managed to deal with this problem. Only once did antagonism reach such a peak that it poured out first into bitter ideological polemics and then into repression on a scale never before seen in China. This occurred during one of the shortest of Chinese dynasties, that of Qin. It was this episode from Chinese history that was taken as the basis for the campaign "to criticize Lin Biao and Confucius." Mao Zedong took the role of Qin Shihuan, opponents were given the role of Confucianists. L. S. Perelomov demonstrated thoughtfulness and precision in describing this campaign. First it was necessary to equip the advocates of Legalism with some sort of indisputable, fundamental preferences. With this goal in mind there is a discussion on the question of periodization of Chinese history. The discussion encompasses only scholarly circles but is not carried out in a scholarly style since it has a previously-set goal--to make Legalism appear to be more progressive

than Confucianism. This desire is so great and so evident that even the grammatical norms of the Chinese language are sacrificed at the hands of Guo Moruo. The well-known resolution of Mao Zedong in the article, "The Chinese Revolution and the Communist Party of China [KPK]," saying that "since the times of the Zhou and Qin dynasties a feudal society has existed in China," was turned around by Guo Moruo to read, "Beginning in the time of the Zhou Qin feudal society has existed in China" (p 249). The author proposes that a similar interpretation of one of Mao's most well-known sayings on questions of ancient history as well as the appearance in HONGQI of Guo Moruo's article, "Problems in the Periodization of Ancient Chinese History," could not have occurred without the direct participation of the chairman. "Mao Zedong, the author is firmly convinced, was the initiator and inspiration for the given article," writes L. S. Perelomov (p 251) and continues further to prove this, consistently revealing the hidden logic of the campaign--attributing Confucianism to slave-holding structures and Legalism to feudalism the reactionary nature of Confucianism is postulated and then it becomes simple to turn reaction into counterrevolution, transforming Confucianism into the target for criticism by the "broad masses."

To what degree were the supporters of Lin Biao really subject to the influence of Confucianism? In examining the so-called "black notes"--the secret diaries of the official successor to Mao--L. S. Perelomov criticizes Mao's opponents for resurrecting certain rational ideas of Confucius "without evaluating him as a philosopher (or his teachings as a whole) in connection with the role that he and his teachings played in Chinese history" (p 225). I feel that Mao's opponents simply did not set such goals for themselves. They utilized Confucian tradition that had taken hold over many years, that was rooted in the consciousness of traditionally educated people, the principles of Confucian ethics directed against autocracy such as "restraining oneself so as to return to the (old) rules," or "restoring lost kingdoms, regenerating severed clans, bringing the alienated people back to responsibility" (p 224). Most likely they did not plan a broader reception of Confucian doctrine, one that would require a systematic and complete assimilation of the teachings of the "perfect wiseman" and most likely they did not suspect that he was soon fated to be subject to such a stupefying "popularity."

One more remark in connection with Confucianism. In admitting the contradictions in Confucianism, L. S. Perelomov tends toward a negative evaluation. "On the whole," he writes, "Confucianism, especially in the interpretation of Zhu Xi, played a reactionary role in the history of the country" (p 226). I feel that this statement as applied to the entire history of the country can be accepted only with important reservations or elaborations. First of all, what does the reference to Zhu Xi mean? Does it mean that Confucianism prior to Zhu Xi was less reactionary than after him or that the philosophy of Zhu Xi was especially reactionary if compared to, for example, the philosophy of Wang Yangming? If the author meant the former, then his thesis is very debateable. Of course Confucianism was never the banner for revolutionary movements, but during stable periods in history its reactionary nature hardly surpassed the reactionary nature of any official doctrine in societies with pre-capitalist structures. If we compare Confucianism with its possible competitors here we can ascertain only a general indetermination. It is not likely that Chinese

history would be a more attractive spectacle if Legalism and not Confucianism were the victor. The same can be said of Buddhism and Taoism. This is the way we should approach the lack of practicality in Confucianism. After all, Legalism, the most practical of doctrines, served as an instrument in the creation of an empire in which normal public life was practically impossible for everyone, including the emperor himself, and impractical Confucianism was able to demonstrate its practical necessity over many centuries. But with these thoughts we are approaching a group of problems that are related to L. S. Perelomov's book very indirectly.

A. A. Krushinskiy (Institute of Eastern Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences). While being very important independently, the first part of the work under discussion by L. S. Perelomov can at the same time be examined as a preparation for the second part of the book, devoted to the upheavals of the political campaign "criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius," and to the use of the spiritual inheritance and historical facts from the past in the course of this campaign. We will deal with the second half of the book which evidently provides the most thorough analysis of the given phenomenon in native literature as regards factual detail as well as the high level of theoretical conceptualization--the attempt to interpret facts with the aid of a clearly defined thought construct, the concept of the institution "history-politics." Assuming that on the whole the author was successful at his goal, we will try to express several points that do not have as their purpose the belittling of the great worth of L. S. Perelomov's work but that will be supplementary in nature, emphasizing certain aspects that were not treated comprehensively enough by the author.

While focusing on unmasking the false methodology of the campaign's leaders, on decoding the allusions of "allegorical historiography" during this period and on revealing the intrigues and political machinations which were the underlying cause for various theoretical constructs of Chinese ideologists during that time, that is, while revealing the secrets of the Maoist political "kitchen" L. S. Perelomov does not find it possible to give attention to one essential aspect of the campaign, the internal logic for the development of the ideas themselves, the ideas that were the basis for numerous ideological formulations made by the Chinese Communist Party during the 1970's. Abstraction from the conceptual side of the phenomenon being analyzed was evident, for example, in the paucity of reminders that during those years there was a comparison of the "provincialism" of Confucius and the theory of Lin Biao about "genius" (pp 264-266). This does not correspond to the proportion of their use in the campaign and in our opinion this is insufficient for elucidating the essence and the interrelationships of these concepts. In addition, the conceptual network formed by these "theories" together with the concept of "revolution" represents well the effect of the logic and ideas which we have mentioned. For this reason let us discuss this further.

"Teaching on Heavenly Commands" attributed to Confucius and the "theory of heavenly capacities" attributed to Lin Biao are organically tied to one another through the idea of "heavenly sanctions" that legitimize the power of the ruler or that imbue an individual with special powers from birth. Consequently, according to the thinking of Chinese ideologists, "the theory of heavenly capacities" is an individual case within the "teaching on heavenly capacities."

Despite the fact that what has been said is obvious, the fact noted by us is important in at least two regards. First, it enables us to note a kind of logic in the arguments of Chinese authors who, it would seem, artificially related these two concepts, which gives evidence of a certain internal life in the concepts being examined, something which cannot be narrowed down to arbitrary speculation arising from the immediate needs of a political battle.

Less trivial and much more important is the interrelationship between "teachings about heavenly commands" and the concept of "revolution" (gemin). They are antitheses, contradictory with regard to "command"--in one case "the acceptance of command" and in the other "the change of command." The first deals with an old, traditional world view, characterized as passive and pessimistic; it is associated with Confucianism. The second, contradictory, concept is presented as a new "revolutionary" world view and proclaims "an active view of life," and "revolutionary optimism." Its national sources are perceived to be "progressive" national traditions, and in particular the thesis of "legalist" Xiongzi concerning the "overcoming of heavenly commands (fate)." A clear manifestation of the given antithesis is the following slogan: "Not believing in divine command but working to change it."<sup>1</sup>

The correlations in meaning of the type mentioned above undoubtedly were an important factor in the ideological campaign "to criticize Lin Biao and Confucius." Thus, for example, it appears to us that regardless of the like or dislike of Mao Zedong (and other political leaders of the Chinese Communist Party) for Confucianism and Legalism, the "teachings about heavenly commands" and the concept of "gemin" must enter into conflict in the minds of modern Chinese ideologists as soon as they begin to theorize in old Chinese categories.

V. A. Maslennikov (Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences). In the light of the book by L. S. Perelomov it is interesting to look at the problem of the relationship between Chinese political ideology and public production. Chinese economic history is a surprising example of the recurrence of basic developmental tendencies at different stages. In the course of its long history the Chinese economy did not stand in one place as regards quantitative growth and volume. Slowly, with some disruptions, but persistently, there was a growth in the population of the country and with this, a growth in labor resources. Large areas of land were assimilated for economic turnover in the course of many centuries in antiquity and during the middle ages.

At the same time, the qualitative parameters of economic development hardly changed. Crops growing in beds, primitive agricultural equipment, dams built with the aid of shovels and wheelbarrows--this was the eternal aspect of farming. With time even a certain regression was observed. Agricultural activities of man in China resulted in the destruction of forests. Overpopulation encouraged the excessive growth of field-crop cultivation instead of other important branches.

Herein, incidentally, lies the key to the understanding of still another rather important binary opposition that L. S. Perelomov only establishes-- "Confucian stale goods 'hold to the center'," versus "the philosophy of Marxism is the philosophy of struggle" (p 266).



Improvements in production were the result not of technical innovations but of the more intensive utilization of workers while their return was decreasing. The result of this was periodic production crises, followed by social storms in the course of which the disproportion between labor resources and plowland became equalized.

The absence of noticeable changes in the composition of production forces hindered the evolution of production relations. It is natural that in the changes in social structure and the state apparatus cyclic features are in evidence, as they are for the entire economic organism. It is possible to single out two production phases with regard to this; each stage has its own social and political characteristics.

The rising phase of development is preceded by a favorable relationship between land and labor resources. As a rule it is preceded by a calamitous "reordering" of the demographic situation, the basic mechanism regulating population growth in early societies. During this period there is a rapid assimilation of neglected lands, fields and empty fields. The irrigation network is renewed. The return on supplementary labor is very great because the total aim is frequently simply to repair the neglected. The course of the restoration process is accelerated noticeably as a result of an active economic policy by the administration.

Economic development facilitates the growth of the surplus product, removed by taxes and withdrawals into the treasury. As the budgetary independence of the state apparatus increases, its general economic, building and military functions become more significant. The richer the flow of mobilized resources (work force, grain, cloth, products from cottage industries and city handicrafts), the more direct the striving of the leadership for political centralism.

The falling phase is characterized by a slowing down of production growth until it stops completely. The Chinese themselves have noted that usually after a dynasty change the teahouses located along roads are about 20 li (10 kilometers) from one another. With each new generation this distance decreases by half--this is the speed with which the population is growing. With time the increase in the number of village and especially of city residents falls abruptly. Thus the crisis itself is delayed for a long time. However, it is not possible to stop its coming completely.

The deterioration of per capital production indicators curtails mobilization possibilities. The more and more sluggish and slower movement of resources from below up affects first the economic and then the public sphere. Since the economic structure of those in power is undermined, a "coming to earth" of the political center of gravity occurs. Step by step authoritativeness is replaced by milder forms of rule, tyranny is replaced by patron relationships and the emperor becomes not the despot and autocrat but the representative of Heaven, in all his actions and activities. The middle components in the social structure come to the fore--the so-called bureaucracies, local organs of power. The latter are called upon to satisfy growing demands to support effective feedback communications.



The harsh differences in conditions experienced by society at different stages of its evolution result in changes in social consciousness. In particular there are changes in the emphases placed on the ruling political ideology. This reflection is all the more straightforward the simpler the structure of the social organism and the more abrupt the transition from one set of conditions to another.

Confucius lived during the early classical epoch at a time when there was a noticeable preponderance of dynamic production structures and forms over traditional; in addition to the political formations inherited from the deep past a new type of state was crystallized. He did not create a final theory of state administration, dealing primarily with solving moral problems. The theme of society and state seems to form the outer aspect of his interests. However, a most direct tie existed between one and the other. As we know, Confucius' moral search found its completion in the concepts of Jiongzhi--the noble man. The noble man is not just an amorphous idealized personality but a public personality. The sum total of its internal qualities were to become the model for the state system to which Confucius called and which had already exhausted its potential. If we summarize the statements of the author of "Longyouya" the basic characteristics of the model can be narrowed down to the following.

First we have complexity of structure, multiple developments according to plan, a richness of content. The idea of a multinomial structure applies more to a traditional society comprised of multiple components of differing sizes. These are primarily basic production collectives--the family, the community, as well as their associations within the framework of large or even very large patron structure; these are also officials of various ranks, from the lowest to the highest. The ruling house together with its head are also included in the mosaic of the traditional society.

Second we have the adherence to the principle of hierarchy, pyramid, coordination. The internal complexity of the noble man is not the complexity of the conglomerate. Jiongzhi is the self-knowing personality, creatively transforming itself by means of a constant intensity of will. The very fact of its presence communicates the meaning of the surroundings and lends harmony to the external world. Confucius supported the hierarchal social order enlightened by thousands of years of tradition and protecting the rights of aristocrats. The stability of the latter was to cement society, to guarantee its moral health. True hierarchy, in the opinion of Confucius, does not negate lower levels, each element is functional if it responds to its role and only in this way can it manifest itself in the best way. In this way smoothness of transition from one level to another, balance and completeness of the entire system are achieved.

Third we have the existence of mutual dependence, linkage and reverse ties among the elements of the structure. It is the mission of the noble man to support the unity of the internal and external, of that which is above and that which is below. This concept is directly related to that of the golden mean, the middle components which unify social structure into a monolithic and vital whole.

Not one of the aforementioned principles corresponded to the Legalist concept of the nature of state. They already saw the contours of a non-traditional society imbued with extreme antagonism and unheard of class enmity. This type of society did not need the hereditary aristocracy or the noble man. Instead, a new force was entering the political arena--absolutism, always aiming for self-aggrandizement and therefore foreign to any restraining, statically-balanced beginning. In the national economic sphere the move toward unlimited self-growth was manifest in the consistent mobilization of all production resources without a consideration of local situations. Internal policy was subordinate to foreign, which was thoroughly warlike, expansionist and aggressive.

We know that the main production force, the main public production resource, is man. Absolutism needed such human material to build the empire. As a result of this, in the opinion of Legalists, it became necessary to form the obedient mass man essentially devoid of personal qualities. "The people must be weak" was the motto of the powerful developing state.

The views of legalists were most fully reflected in the political practices of Qin Shihuang. Most likely this can be explained by the specific characteristics of the period itself, with its constant wars for hegemony, in the course of which each side resorted to extreme measures. In addition, China, just recently united under the Qin, still was not a complete state. The mobilization of local resources to the center was total in nature, judging by documents that have come down to us. It is enough to recall the unusual scale of building of Qin Shihuang.

Nevertheless, the political concepts of the Legalists found their supporters even later. We could probably say that the Legalist model of state was utilized regularly to some degree in the long course of Chinese history. It was adapted by Wu Di (Western Han dynasty), Yang Guan (Sui dynasty), Li Shimin (second representative of the Tang house) and Zhu Di (Ming dynasty), i.e. each time the conditions were ripe for economic centralism, as discussed above.

In one or another sometimes unique form these conditions were created more than once by the social-economic realities of modern China. With the growth of factory-plant industry in the early part of this century a new, powerful economic stratum developed in the country in the form of a capitalist city. Its assimilation capabilities with regard to traditional resources surpassed many times over the mobilization capabilities of ancient as well as medieval Chinese despots. The political anarchy of the Bieyang period, accompanied by a struggle among military groups for spheres of influence, only accelerated the process of redistribution of material production factors (raw materials, foodstuffs, others) which was so damaging to backward rural regions. The further strengthening of urban economy at the price of rural economy was observed during the pre-war decade. It is interesting to note that all of these purely production changes were immediately manifest in the sphere of public consciousness. A number of military leaders of that time as well as the leading representatives of the Kuomintang obviously held great-power, etat views.

With the formation of the Chinese Communist Party for the first time in the history of China real prerequisites arose for eliminating the negative national

economic and consequently, social-political tendencies of the past. The Chinese Communist Party adopted a course of economic development meeting the interests of all the people and not just one narrow stratum of society. Because of the perfection of the political mechanism of people's power, in the course of a number of years it was possible to secure an extremely rapid pace of industrialization as well as of growth in the standard of living of broad masses, especially peasants. Cycles, disproportions, the unidirectionality of economic ties--all of these reasons for the growth of bureaucratic centralism and authoritativeness were banished forever, or so it seemed.

Unfortunately, the subsequent quarter of a century period in the existence of the CCP attests to the opposite. At the present time the degree of production centralization resulting from the needs of the privileged military sector cannot be compared to what was observed at any time in the past. The scale of military economy corresponds to the size of withdrawals, various payments and receipts bleeding agriculture and branches related to it.

As always, the mobilization of resources results in the necessity for harsh ideological control. The new supporters of Legalist methods of state building are striving to do everything to destroy the consciousness of the individual. The preferable social structure based on the individual, in the opinion of Maoists, must come down to the existence of the million-faced Lei Fang or the people on the one hand and the suprapersonality of the leader on the other.

The national economy of the CCP still is in no condition to turn from the consequences of the galloping strategy of Mao. The present Peking leadership is following in the footsteps of the "great helmsman" in many respects, not excluding the reason that Legalist concepts in the area of state building will in the future continue to play a significant role in the public-political life of China.

A. S. Murguzin (Institute of Far Eastern Studies, USSR Academy of Sciences). A lively interest in national history is characteristic of all peoples. However, it would be difficult to imagine that we would have enough interest in the past to occupy ourselves for several years with events of the past, such as Igor's campaign against the Polovtsy. The unexhausted sense of ties with the past felt by the Chinese attests to the viability of historical tradition. The unusual structure of the book under discussion, which carries us from events that took place 2,500 years ago to the China of the 1970's reflects this circumstance. In connection with this L. S. Perelomov discusses the institution "politics-history" (p 3-4). There are material reasons for the significant pressure of the past on modern China as well as purely spiritual--the preservation of traditional stereotypic modes of thought among the Chinese people.

In connection with the publication of L. S. Perelomov's very interesting book I would like to discuss some problems in the development of Chinese despotism and the final results of the functioning of state forms discovered by ancient philosophers in the context of the existence of Chinese ethnos. . . After all, the most important peculiarities in the historical development of Chinese society can be explained in part by distinctive forms of government. In addition, I

will touch on some of the reasons why relations of the traditional type are repeated in the People's Republic of China, bringing urgency to many problems that agitated the minds of ancient philosophers.

Still in the Zhanguo epoch (8th to 3rd centuries B.C.) the thought of Chinese philosophers was focused on the problem of building a powerful state under the absolute power of an autocrat. Each of the two main philosophical schools that developed during this period--Confucianism and Legalism--suggested how this could be done. From the materials in L. S. Perelomov's book it follows that legalism developed somewhat earlier and that it posed the question of what principles to base Chinese government on in a broader way than Confucianism (pp 42-45). The legalist principle of "fa," which was contrasted with the principle of ritual (or regulation)"li" by Confucius, confirmed the equality of all before the law. In practical terms this meant the equalization of all before state power, i.e. the withdrawal of the rights of the hereditary aristocracy for political power. It is hard to imagine how this could have been achieved with the Confucian principle of "li." For this reason it is quite normal that the first Chinese despotic regime of Qin was Legalist. In connection with this it is interesting to recall V. A. Maslennikov's remarks concerning the fact that these two schools reflect the regularity of two basic phases in the cyclical development of Chinese history: Legalism--the beginning phase, the ascent, the pulling of power towards the center and the assimilation of resources; Confucianism--developed despotism (this school's theory strives to protect it from self-destruction as a result of excessive centralization). For this reason, Confucianists as opposed to Legalists emphasize the importance of morality and ethics in the ruling class. The interest in Legalism at the beginning of practically every dynasty is thus understandable.

L. S. Perelomov relates the flight toward union to the growth of trade, the greater facility in cultural ties between governments and the destruction of private lands in rural communities (pp 16, 40). In my opinion special emphasis should be laid on the significance of the foreign factor. In antiquity and during the early Middle Ages China was periodically overrun by nomads, and the importance of this factor should not be underestimated. The role of trade and financial relations, although undoubtedly great, was secondary in this case. Moreover, I feel that the idea that trade and financial relations played a decisive role in unifying China is internally contradictory. On the one hand their high enough level is essential for unification; on the other their rapid development as a result of favorable conditions created by unification resulted in economic structuralization and the violation of traditional ties, facilitating the fall of the dynasty. The flowering of trade and financial relations usually occurs at the end of the cycle and signals a coming decline.

It appears that in truth there was a different scheme of development. This is that the development of a single centralized state created the best conditions for economic development. The expansion of trade and financial relations could have been encouraged by the political, military and economic needs of the state itself. Grandiose structures such as the Great Wall forced the people to intermingle and united them into a nation more so than trade and economic ties of themselves.



The first task of the centralized power was the shattering of the hereditary aristocracy. The next step on the path toward absolute power was to take over the commune. At that time the commune was the most important economic and even political unit. Absolutism was incompatible with the commune principle of constructing the state--the great power of commune elders contradicted the absolute power of the emperor. In their tracts Legalists put forth the principle of "weakening the people" by means of splintering them. Evidently this referred primarily to the commune. From the reforms of Shang Yang it is clear how this was done--all of the people were divided into artificial formations, tens, hundreds, etc., as if there had never been any communes, and families. Legalists began their fight against the commune by destroying communal property and the system of "jing-tian," after which they began to develop private family land use as the first step toward a system of private land ownership. In this they could depend on a stratum of prosperous commune owners who were interested in curtailing the reallocation of land. At the same time the destruction of the commune undermined the authority of the elders, which aroused their dissatisfaction. During the years of the Qin dynasty legalists operated too directly and uncompromisingly, which was one of the reasons for the quick demise of the dynasty.

The question of the fate of the Chinese commune remains debateable even now. Some scholars, including most Chinese, feel that the commune was destroyed in ancient China. L. S. Perelomov believes that Chinese despotism could not destroy it completely, but from some of what he says it follows that communal property disappeared. At the same time data for the 19th to early 20th centuries attests to the existence of communal property (in some cases considerable)--land, small woods, ponds, etc. Extensive family and clan property was preserved in the southern provinces of China settled by emigrants from the north. Concepts of a methodological nature also force us to suppose that the Chinese commune survived although it took on a form we were not used to. Despotism could not eradicate it completely but from then on the commune was not officially recognized in policy (from the point of view of the leadership only artificial formations existed--"lin-li" and later "baojia." The oppressed condition of rural communes was apparently the reason for the development of various organizations that replaced the commune--secret unions and societies.

The third principle developed by legalists in their scheme of Chinese government called for the concentration of all resources in order to satisfy needs and increase the power of the despot. The weak state formations of the period Yin to Zhou (18th to 8th centuries B.C.) were based on communal land ownership with certain obligations on the part of the communes to the advantage of the state. Legalists ended this system. According to Legalist ideas the state, through its administrative apparatus, must be in charge of all labor and material resources of the people. In connection with this each family (and not commune) had to contribute a quit-rent and was obligated for compulsory military and work services (the triad of obligations). In order to have access to each peasant family while bypassing the commune land-surveys were instituted (descriptions of land with an indication of their quality) and periodically updated with an indication of how much tax each family could pay. As we can see from a description of the reforms of Shang Yang, their initiators tried to destroy not only the commune but large families in general in an attempt to reach the nuclear family.



At the same time Legalists developed a system of state monopolies which together with the triad of obligations became one of the pillars of Chinese despotism. By centralizing all available material and labor resources the state maintained its apparatus and realized other important social functions which were fully developed later--securing internal and foreign security, the organization and production of grandiose public works, insurance from natural calamities (public storehouses and granaries).

From L. S. Perelomov's evaluation of the contribution the Legalists made (p 215) it is clear that the structure of Chinese government was built basically according to the Legalist blueprint. Legalists developed the concepts of equal possibilities, the renewal of the class of officials and the gradations within it, collective guarantee, the unification of manners of thought, etc. What then is the contribution of Confucius, who is considered the "father of the nation," and of his teaching, the official ideology of imperial China? It was he who made the political system operable, who balanced it and who replaced the bare principle of autocracy with some ideological elements--the cult of Heaven, the related idea of the world-organizing function of the emperor and his high officials, the world-organizing function of China in the outer world, the concept of the ideal "jiongzhi" personality and of the ideal official who officiates by setting a noble example.

The uppermost stratum of officialdom found its ideology in Confucianism because it more than adequately expressed their interests. Leaders of communes received certain privileges and honorable titles ("shi," "xiao," "di") and greater possibilities in their official careers as compensation for the withdrawal of some of their rights. Official jurisprudence was built on Confucian canons. As a result Confucianism made the coarse concepts of Legalism, based on force, operable and palatable for Chinese society of that time.

I would like to discuss a question not dealt with by L. S. Perelomov, that of the results of the development of Chinese government and state from the beginnings mentioned above. All of the subsequent history of China from the Qin empire until 1911 is the natural result of the purposeful development of Chinese society maintained on a certain foundation.

Let's recall that as a result of the early transition to farming the Chinese had an advantage over neighboring peoples. To the north and northwest of Chinese centers of settlement the people were occupied in livestock farming; when necessary they could gather into a large horde. For this reason the threat from the north was always the main one. The need for protection against nomad attacks dictated the necessity to unite China under a powerful despot. Actually, after the unification of China the picture changed abruptly--already in the Qin dynasty, which only lasted 14 years, the building of the Great Wall was begun. Now it was not nomads who threatened China with attacks, but it was numerous well-armed Chinese armies that moved into the steppe, forcing nomadic tribes to become vassals of the Chinese empire and to pay it tribute.

The unification of China created the most favorable conditions for the rapid growth in the Chinese ethnos, which began to spread first to the south where there was a great deal of "free" land (occupied by tribes of hunters-gatherers).

Regardless of whether the Chinese moved south or north they pursued a policy of pushing out and exterminating the local population, or of assimilating it partially. Because of the great cultural superiority of the Chinese over their neighbors the tactic of assimilation always brought its fruits in the end, and "barbarian" dynasties became Chinese. As a result the Chinese monoethos covered all the area accessible to it. Only the land that could not be used for agriculture was left to the "barbarians."

In the course of the entire existence of imperial China (over 2,000 years) the Chinese considered their country the center of the world and dealt with their neighbors, the "barbarians" in world-ordering functions which narrowed down to exterminating them or pushing them out onto lands that could not be used for farming. Chinese chronicles are replete with the cruelties suffered by the Chinese at the hands of northern neighbor-nomads. However, if these peoples had been able to write they probably could have described even worse things from the Chinese. An especially merciless policy of pushing out and exterminating neighbors was carried out in the south (tribes located south of the Yangtze River), who because of their living conditions could not join together to fight off the aggressor.

Thus, despite the problems and periodic catastrophic falls of the national state, the Chinese feel that the historic experience of Chinese despotism was very successful. Many of the achievements in antiquity and in the medieval period in political, economic and cultural areas were the result to one degree or another of a successfully discovered scheme of state. Apparently this is the source of the Chinese piety toward their historical and cultural inheritance. They are still "hypnotized" by their past, by their "leading" role among other peoples, and it seems that they still are incapable of accepting the idea of the equality of all peoples. A characteristic example is the attack on Vietnam in 1979, which according to the People's Republic of China was a "punitive action," a "punishment" to Vietnam for improper behavior.

The Chinese are still trying to find answers to modern problems in the works of ancient philosophers who, in our opinion, are hopelessly antiquated. The reason for this is that modern Chinese society is not completely modern--it is conditionally modern. Revealing, for example, is the Maoist concept of China's position in the world--it is surrounded by foreign countries ("barbarians") and in order to survive it needs severe centralization because the external world is much too strong and hostile to China. In today's China the power of state in comparison to antiquity is much increased due to the appearance of a huge state economy. For the authoritarian, centralized power in China the problem of "weakening the people" remains urgent, but the increased power of the state allows for a different approach to it. The state is capable of using relatively large economic associations of peasants (brigades, communes) similar in size and function to village communes--its effect on these communes is so great that their collective property can be classified as semi-state.

The traditional nature of modern Chinese society is based to a great degree on the fact that two-thirds of the population of China is still comprised of peasants working in manual labor, equipped basically with only traditional

implements and utilizing traditional agrotechnology. Socially the peasants were traditional at the time of the Chinese revolution, and not of the petty bourgeoisie. The traditional peasantry is much inferior to the petty bourgeoisie in economic potential and is more primitive in social organization. In the economic plan it has not yet developed into a marketable economy, and in old China it was tied to the market through intermediaries (landlords) or by force, i.e. it was necessary to sell their products to pay rent, taxes, etc.

Thus, the main hindrance to socio-economic development in the PRC is the archaic condition of the rural economy and the equally archaic social consciousness of the peasantry. The most acute economic and social problems of the PRC are to a large degree the result of the peculiarities of the historical development of the country. It is in the ancient and medieval history of China, in my opinion, that we can find the roots of the basic problems facing the PRC now.

First of all there is the problem of the unfavorable relationship of people and material resources with regard to the availability of plowland and the fact that it arose is the reverse of the successful solution to the question of the form of the Chinese state in antiquity and medieval times. The development of favorable external and internal conditions (due to despotism) for the dissemination of Chinese civilization resulted in the fact that the Chinese ethnos occupied a space more and more accessible to it and gradually began to harden. The Chinese assimilated all of the land that could be farmed and then began to work the less desirable, terracing on slopes. Gradually forests and meadows disappeared, everything replaced by plowland. The transition to labor-intensive cultivation of crops in rows began. The quantity of working and productive livestock began to decrease and as a result there was a tendency to replace work animals with the muscles of man and labor productivity fell. The Chinese peasants moved almost completely to a vegetable diet, which enabled them to "economize" on a large quantity of foodstuffs.

In recent times there has developed an extremely unfavorable relationship between the population and natural resources. Since the formation of the PRC this relationship has continued to deteriorate--whereas in 1952 one rural resident had 3.29 mu of plowland, in 1957--3.08 mu, in 1980 the figure was about 2 mu. Agrarian reform resulted in an improvement in the standard of living of peasants. This acted to invest resources into manual labor, securing a rapid pace of agricultural development during the years of the first five-year plan (1953-1957). The effect of this factor could not last long. For the long-term the investment of resources into manual labor turned out to be a demographic investment--the peasants reacted to their higher standard of living with traditional and stereotyped behavior, with demographic growth, which "eats up" the effects of limited steps to modernize agriculture.

The weakness of production forces in agriculture and the archaic condition of its technical base are reflected in the social sphere. In actual fact in the PRC there is a renewal of attitudes and traditions of the old society, those of the type "emperor-subjects" and "official-the people," and so forth. An analysis of press reports and eyewitness reports describes the depressed status of workers (especially peasants) before the stratum of authorized persons.

Within the social plan the power of the workers was mediated by the stratum of authorized persons and the influence of the latter on the economic and public life of the country became stronger. Later on, these negative tendencies were aided by Maoism, leading to the phenomenon referred to in Soviet literature as the "deformation of the socialist structure." A confirmation of Maoism and the deformations initiated by it is now giving birth to conditions for the renewal of some relationships that are similar to traditional ones, such as "peasant-official," "state-people," "country-village," etc.

Such a multifaceted influence of the strengths and traditions of the old society could not but affect the forms of political struggle. It has also been dressed in traditional garb, and political opponents have taken "antiquity" as their weapon. L. S. Perelomov writes, "The very nature of the regime in power--the military-bureaucratic grouping of Mao--developed and tolerated only one possible form of open political struggle between enemy forces and groups--turning to historical inheritance" (p 8). Mao's opponents in the 1960's (Deng Tuo and others) utilized the form of the historical anecdote, plays on historical subjects and Maoists themselves draped their struggle against "revisionists" in the form of a campaign against Confucius. In actual fact, in order to "predict the development of events in the PRC even on the front of 'politics-history' it would be essential to conceive of the real status of this institution in Chinese culture" (p 4). The book under discussion gives the reader an idea about the political thought of the Chinese, which is of great practical significance.

L. S. Perelomov's monograph is topical in both its sections--that devoted to antiquity as well as that devoted to the political life of the PRC. It clearly demonstrates the topicality of thorough historical research. Unfortunately, there are people who feel that topicality is limited by the framework of today. Such a trivial consumer's view of history reminds us of the attitude of short-sighted farmers toward nature--all that is important is what happens to the business today, what comes later is not. These people do not understand that that which exists today is the result of the past. In other words, modern reality can be understood truly and completely only by examining it in historical perspective.

L. P. Delyusin (Institute of Eastern Studies, USSR Academy of Sciences). In the 1970's in China there was an avalanche of books and articles on Confucianism and Legalism. The campaign criticizing Lin Biao, who under the leadership of Mao Zedong purged the party and state apparatus, was accompanied by the criticism of the ancient philosopher Confucius and the praising of emperor-Legalists Qin Shihuang. Following the wishes of Mao Zedong the political activists of antiquity were pulled into the political struggle which was to decide the fate of China. Confucius, who was considered "a long dried-out corpse," and his teaching, which was also considered long out of date, suddenly became the main hindrance on the path of Maoist transformation of China. The ancient philosopher was cursed as the reactionary ideologue for the restoration of capitalism, and the ancient despotic emperor was praised as a progressive reformer whose experience could be utilized with the goal of building socialism. In opening a newspaper or magazine the Chinese reader learned the sensational news, often of a scandalous nature, about the "evil



doings" of Confucius and his students and about the "accomplishments" of the followers of Qin Shihuang. In the course of the campaign all of the political activists, philosophers and writers of old China were divided into two categories--Legalists and Confucianists, good and bad, with evaluations being placed arbitrarily following the wishes of Mao Zedong and his henchmen, who did not consider either truths or fact. The Chinese could have described this campaign in the words of a poet: "Some remain alive and praised,/Others must be dead and abused,/All we know for certain is toadying,/Which alone reigns supreme."

As correctly stated in L. S. Perelomov's book, the campaign criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius was to strengthen Maoism by uniting it with Legalism. "This ancient Chinese political teaching was officially proclaimed one of the national sources of Maoism...The extolling of Legalism was necessary for Mao Zedong to publicly deal with his ideological enemy of old--early Confucianism" (p 8).

The research conducted by L. S. Perelomov, already a well-known authority on Legalism, and translator and commentator on the Legalist text, "The Book of the Ruler in the Shang Region,"<sup>2</sup> allows us to better understand why Mao Zedong was so taken with legalism and its model emperor Qin Shihuang and why he turned so maliciously against Confucius and his followers.

The division of the book into two parts by L. S. Perelomov--the historical and the political--has a logical justification, it seems to us.

The first part shows and analyzes the social and historical prerequisites for the development and struggle between two different schools of public and political thought in ancient China, each of which was a pretender to the role of mentor to the ruler. The maturation and formation of Legalist and Confucian views into an ideological and political doctrine is examined by the author on a background of those social and economic changes that occurred in China in the 6th to the 3d centuries B.C.

L. S. Perelomov presented and commented in detail on the views of early and late Legalists--Guang Zhong, Zi Chan and naturally, Shang Yang. The latter is given a great deal of attention by the author, who emphasizes that his teaching "was directed primarily at absolutizing imperial power and at creating a powerful state capable of swallowing up its neighbors" (p 108). Shang Yang felt that humanity, justice preached by Confucianism only served as a barrier on the path toward establishing order on earth. He stood for the introduction of strict laws to secure despotic power. An important place in the Legalist conceptions of Shang Yang was the idea of the usefulness of war, since war created the most favorable conditions for the individual power of the emperor (p 121). Shang Yang developed the concept of the harm of education, since knowledge is not at all necessary for the people, for whom the main occupations should be farming and war. (Here we see the direct connection with

<sup>2</sup>Shang jiong shu (The Book of the Ruler of the Shang Region). Translation, introduction and commentary. L. S. Perelomov, Moscow, 1966.



some of the sayings of Mao Zedong). Shang Yang recommended to the emperor policies that would make the people powerless before the despotic state, saying, "When the people are weak, the state is strong; when the state is strong, the people are weak. For this reason the state, following the true path, strives to keep the people weak" (p 128).

Considerable space in the book by L. S. Perelomov is devoted to an analysis of the views of Confucius and his followers. It would seem that nothing new could be said on this subject. Hundreds of thousands of pages have been written about Confucianism in many of the languages of the world. A colossal number of books and articles have been written about Confucianism. Nevertheless, the problem of Confucius, evaluating his role in the history of Chinese culture, in the formation of a national ethic and psychology, in establishing forms of state and methods of political-administrative management, still is the subject of disagreements in the course of which the true face of the ancient philosopher is distorted and his teachings are obscured or discussed, depending upon the political passions and ideology of the commentators. In the course of the campaign to criticize Lin Biao and Confucius attempts were made to prove that Confucius and Chinese culture are completely juxtaposed to one another and that if he played any role in the formation of the spiritual essence of the Chinese nation this role was completely negative or else insignificant. In the book under discussion there is a justifiable emphasis that "in contrast to Legalism, Confucianism had a much greater influence on the development of China, because it encompassed broader spheres of life, and primarily the spiritual. The teachings of Confucius greatly determined the parameters for the development of thought and national character in the Chinese" (p 217).

L. S. Perelomov attentively analyzes the sayings of Confucius regarding the moral norms of human society, his teachings on the significance of the principle of living mankind both in interrelationships between people as well as in administering a state. The author demonstrates well that Confucius pondered over the question of "how to teach the people to live and deal with each other" (p 82). In discussions with his students he tried to find an answer to this important question. "The views of Confucius on the structure of society," writes L. S. Perelomov, "were based partly on those moral categories and values which at one time existed in the Chinese commune. But he introduced much that was new, as for example the cult of literacy, the cult of education" (p 84). In striving to create the ideal state, supported by the educated and competent officials, Confucius idealized the past for in his reality there was no such model to imitate.

L. S. Perelomov correctly notes that "being a supporter of the authoritarian system, Confucius was at the same time an opponent of the excessive absolutization of imperial power" (p 96). According to Confucius, the rights of emperors should have been limited. Confucius also spoke against the exploitation of the people. In this, as in other cases, he demonstrated a characteristic typical of himself--a fear of extremes, the striving to find balanced, compromise methods for solving serious problems. In his ideal state Confucius, as the author of the book notes, foresaw the preservation of the role of communes in the life of Chinese society. "We can propose," writes L. S.

Perelomov, "that Confucius attributed not only educational but certain jurisprudential functions to the commune" (p 107).

Turning to the evolution of Legalism and Confucianism, the author strives to find polarizations and similarities in these teachings, those traits which in the Han epoch lent themselves to unification in a single system of state administration. Very comprehensive are those pages of the book that analyze the contradictory, drawn-out process in which Legalism and Confucianism merged together. Confucianism, turning away from some of the dogma of its founders and assimilating some aspects of Legalist teaching, acquired new strength as it became the effective ideology of the monarchic structure that was supported by a bureaucracy molded in the Confucian spirit. In examining the process by which Confucianism and Legalism merged into one teaching, which in its time was called the state religion of China, L. S. Perelomov demonstrates how in the course of this process the views of Confucianism changed, became adapted to the needs for supporting a strong monarchical power while at the same time retaining the authority of the moral force, drawing not only on fist-law but also on the principles of morality and justice. We cannot but agree with the author about the fact that "the vital stability of the empire can be attributed to this 'merger' of Legalism and Confucianism, which had a stabilizing effect on the functioning of state institutions and on the public and political life of China" (p 204).

The second half of L. S. Perelomov's book is devoted to politics--the campaign to criticize Lin Biao and Confucius. The author notes correctly that this campaign was begun on the initiative of Mao Jiedun because the goals set by him during the "Cultural Revolution" had not been reached.

In the course of the campaign the criticism of Confucius actually represented a criticism not so much of Lin Biao as of the living opponents of Mao Zedong who interfered with the erection of a monopolistic Maoist state over Chinese society. Lin Biao was proclaimed a follower of Confucius although he was derided as an ignoramus who did not read either books or newspapers. Lin Biao, who supported Mao Zedong in his first steps to establish a feudal-facist regime in China, was accused of supporting humane rule as a true Confucian, of proselytizing the cult of knowledge, of opposing the Legalist-Maoist thesis of "poor people but a rich state." L. S. Perelomov notes that in beginning his punitive campaign, Mao Zedong utilized the progressive tradition of leading Chinese activists fighting against Confucian ideology as the basis for the feudal system. In doing this Mao Zedong hypocritically proclaimed that his goal was the spiritual rejuvenation of the people. L. S. Perelomov is absolutely correct when he writes that for Mao Zedong "it was necessary to eradicate from the consciousness of the people those Confucian ideals that were in conflict with his ideal of the ruler and the man...Under the conditions of the Maoist regime, striving to break traditional family ties and norms for interrelationships and to spiritually subjugate man only to the leader, national stereotypes of behavior began to interfere with the 'education' of the new generation" (p 226).

L. S. Perelomov does not limit himself to a description of the campaign, but shows us its causes, the main one of which was not the opposition to Mao Jiedun

by Lin Biao or Zhou Enlai, but the deep conflict with the entire Chinese society, which tore away from itself the Maoist schemes of social restructuring. The reactionary-Utopian essence of these schemes narrowed down to the fact that they attempted to impose on the Chinese people a political organization that did not consider national character or the socio-economic level of development in the country at all. In aspiring to hold the supreme place in Marxist-Leninist teaching, Mao Zedong grossly violated the precepts of scientific communism. His ideas could be imposed on Chinese society only by using force, which occurred in the course of the ideological campaign criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius. The author convincingly proves that it was Mao Zedong who initiated and inspired this anti-people and anti-social campaign which, contrary to the opinion of some foreign sinologists, instead of improving the cultural level of the masses and spreading historical knowledge to them, served to disseminate ignorance and dark obscure views and concepts. We can speak of no historical method in this campaign and the author writes justifiably about the fact that what Maoists primarily gave rise to was the reactionary tradition of political struggle.

It is true that historical material played a large role in this campaign, which gave the impression of polemics on historical questions, but in truth Maoists pursued only one goal--to discredit their opponents and discipline their supporters. The campaign criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius attests to the fact that once caught in the wheels of the Maoist propaganda machine, historical material was transformed into mythology, into rules and norms of practical activity and behavior for the mass worker in the city and locally. Articles on historical subjects are instructions which were decoded in informational speeches and documents not made public. They served as a signal warning the supporters of Mao Zedong's group about where the enemy was located, what he was contemplating and where thrusts against the enemy had to be strengthened.

I cannot agree with the opinion of the author on the active participation of the masses in this campaign (pp 4, 279). I feel that this participation was not extensive, but rather artificially fabricated by the organizers and leaders of the campaign. This was not activism but an imitation of activism. The articles that were published then did actually have the signatures of workers, peasants, soldiers and students, which was to give the appearance of public opinion and demonstrate the activism of the people in unmasking Confucianism. In reality under the conditions of the Maoist regime even the slightest possibility for the active expression of one's own opinion was completely excluded. In the articles and notes inspired from above and usually written by Mao's assistants there was usually a repetition of official theses. The real attitude of the people toward the campaign was expressed in words that characterized it as a "dog fight."

Right now in China there is once again a disagreement on Confucius and Confucianism. The teaching is being reevaluated again. Again there are different points of view, but political labels are not attached. I feel that L. S. Perelomov's book, written on a high scholarly level, contributes weightily to solving the problem of Confucius and his teachings.

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